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Abstract 
The main objective of this empirical analysis is to provide some evidence in 
the differences in pricing between Asset Securitization bonds such as: Asset 
Backed Securities (ABS), Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) and Collateralized 
Debt Obligations (CDOs) issued in the United States and in the Western 
European market. Using micro and macroeconomic variables as controls the 
study pretends to show the effect that the 2008 financial crisis as well as the deal 
region had in the credit spread of these securities between January 1st, 2000 and 
December 31st, 2016. The sample used, contains 66,354 observations, divided in 
35,453 ABS, 19,941 MBS, and 10,960 CDOs.  
After performing the econometric analysis, it was evident that the 2008 
financial crisis increased the value of the spreads especially in the U.S. Moreover, 
the sovereign debt crisis that occurred in Europe, starting in 2009 with the first 
Covered Bonds Purchase Programme (CBPP) launched by the ECB led to a 
reduction of the credit spreads of these securities with a large reduction until 
2013 and an increase from 2013 to 2016. 
It was also concluded that: (i) a better rating reduces the credit spread for all 
types of AS bonds; (ii) rated AS bonds have lower spreads than not rated ones; 
(iii) higher bond maturities reduce the credit spread of the bond; (iv) higher 
government yields are related to a reduction in the pricing of AS bonds; (v) 
issuances in the UK turned out to have a higher credit spread. In addition, this 
research provides robustness checks with issuer parent details and key ratios that 
helped to confirm the conclusions achieved by the statistical analysis. 
 
 
Keywords: Asset Securitization Bonds, Asset Backed Securities, Mortgage Debt 
Securities, Collateralized Debt Obligations, Credit Spread, Financial Crisis
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Resumo 
O principal objetivo deste estudo empírico é o de fornecer provas entre as 
diferenças de preço entre  “Asset Securitization bonds” (AS bonds) tais como: 
“Asset Backed Securities” (ABS), “Mortgage Backed Securities” (MBS) e 
Collateralized Debt Obligations”(CDOs) emitidas nos Estados Unidos da 
América e na Europa Ocidental. Usando variáveis micro e macroeconómicas 
como variáveis independentes este estudo tem o principal objetivo de mostrar o 
efeito que a crise financeira de 2008 e a região onde estas obrigações foram 
emitidas  tiveram no preço destas obrigações entre 1 de Janeiro de 2000 e 31 de 
Dezembro de 2016. A amostra utilizada tem 66,354 observações (tranches 
emitidas), dividas em 35,453 ABS, 19,941 MBS e 10,906 CDOs. 
Depois de feita a análise ecnométrica, foi claro o impacto que a crise financeira 
de 2008 teve no aumento do preço destas obrigações, com especial relevância nos 
Estados Unidos. Mais ainda, verificou-se que a crise de dívida soberana que 
ocorreu na Europa, começando em 2009 com o primeiro programa de compra de 
obrigações por parte do Banco central Europeu, levou a uma redução do preço 
destes instrumentos financeiros, nomeadamente até 2013, ano a partir do qual os 
preços começaram a subir até 2016. 
Também se conclui que: (i) um rating melhor traduz-se numa redução do 
preço para os três tipos de obrigações analisadas neste estudo; (ii) AS bonds com 
rating têm preços menores do que aquelas sem rating; (iii) obrigações com uma 
maturidade maior traduz-se numa redução do preço das mesmas; (iv) quanto 
maior a “yield” das obrigações do país onde as AS bonds são emitidas, menor é 
o preço das AS bonds; (v) emissões de AS bonds no Reino Unido revelam ter um 
preço maior. Adicionalmente, este estudo fornece uma análise robusta, inserindo 
algumas características relativas aos bancos que emitiram AS bonds durante o 
 x 
período de análise, tendo como objetivo confirmar as conclusões atingidas 
durante a análise estatística. 
 
Palavras-chave: Asset Securitization Bonds, Asset Backed Securities, Mortgage 
Backed Securities, Collateralized Debt Obligations, Preço das Obrigações, Crise 
Financeira 
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Introduction 
Asset Securitization products were very popular until the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis. Indeed, in the “golden age” of financial markets development, that started 
in the early 1970s, the securitization process added value to the economy, 
verifying a fast growth in volumes between 2002 and 2006 (Choudhry and 
Landuyt, 2009). Afterwards, the use of these structured finance products 
decreased exponentially because of the important role played by securitization 
in the 2007-2008 financial crisis, mainly through the issuance of CDOs and other 
types of synthetic securitization.  
The financial crisis that started in the U.S. shortly arrived in Europe and the 
problem became even worse because of the banking credit, real estate and 
mortgages markets just collapsed. These markets were pillars of the economy 
and they directly influenced the bankruptcy of some big investment banks like 
Lehman Brothers on September 15th, 2008 and financial institutions that received 
a bailout, like Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley (both British banks). After 
these events, investors completely lost the confidence in the financial markets 
and the governments had to intervene. It was in that moment that measures 
implemented after the crisis by governments and central banks in Europe and in 
the US were completely different. On the one hand, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) first measure was to decrease the reference interest rates, followed by an 
increase in the maturity of long term refinancing operations, an increase in the 
number of assets used as collateral in fixed income deals, and finally the launch 
of covered bonds purchasing programmes (in total three) in the aftermath of the 
financial turmoil. On the other hand, the Federal Reserve in the U.S. implemented 
programmes in order to restore liquidity in the financial institutions, with the 
purchase of long-term securities aiming to decrease the long-term interest rates. 
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The tools applied by the FED can be divided into three categories. Firstly, FED 
approved bilateral currency swap agreements with several foreign central banks 
to assist these entities in their provision of dollar liquidity. Secondly, FED 
provisioned liquidity directly to borrowers and investors in the most important 
financial markets. Thirdly, with the goal of decreasing long-term interest rates, 
FED started buying MBS in 2012 ($40 billion on average per month), followed by 
the purchase of longer-term Treasury securities ($45 billion on average per 
month) in 2013. In October 2014, FED announced the ending of these purchasing 
programmes. 
Europe was affected by the financial crisis in the U.S, due to the large amount 
of business between the two regions, specially the banking system (the most 
affected area). However, this was not the only problem that Europe faced after 
2008. Actually, just after the financial crisis, Europe faced another big problem, 
the sovereign debt crisis, which severely affected Greece, Portugal, Italy, and 
Spain. This happened because after bailing out the banks, the revenues of the 
governments became lower, the cost of funding increased, the commodities 
prices also incremented, and the government’s deficit jumped as well. Adding 
up this sovereign debt crisis with the failure of the banking system in Iceland, 
determined one of the toughest challenges of the European Union. 
 In order to restore bank funding, the ECB launched three covered bonds 
purchase programmes (CBPP) announced in 2009, 20011, and 2014 and one asset 
backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP), announced in 2014. The 
objective of these programmes was to promote the ongoing decline on money 
market term rates to avoid the potential risk of low inflation. Actually, “CBPP 
has led to a very rapid tightening of covered bond spreads in the secondary 
market and a narrowing of bid-offer spreads” (Beirne, Dalitz, et al., 2011). In 
addition, it has contributed to: 
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i) a fall in money market term rates; 
ii) better funding conditions for credit institutions and enterprises; 
iii) incentive banks and other credit lenders to keep and try to 
increase their lending amounts to clients; 
iv) improve market liquidity in important segments of the private 
debt securities market. 
Surprisingly, the ECB launched an ABS purchase programme (ABSPP), even 
though knowing that these securities were on the roots of the financial crisis. 
However, it is important to understand that securitization is an important tool 
when the aim is to provide short-term liquidity. Therefore, is important to 
highlight that if each securitized tranche of ABS, MBS or CDOs issuances is 
correctly priced, securitization starts to be a way of restoring liquidity in the 
market.  
Using a sample of 24,727 asset securitization bonds issued in the U.S. and 
Western Europe by financial institutions between 2000 and 2016, I cleaned it, and 
achieved a total of 84,580 tranches within those 24,727 AS bonds issued. 
Furthermore, the above-mentioned sample of tranches can be split in 42,705 ABS 
tranches, 26,535 MBS tranches and 15,340 CDOs.  
Consequently, the main purpose of this research is to examine the impact of 
some microeconomic and macroeconomic variables on credit spreads of ABS, 
MBS, and CDOs.  
Securitization is a recent topic. It was introduced in the U.S. in the late 1970s, 
peaked by volume in the 2007, and felt significantly with the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis (Choudhry and Landuyt, 2009). It is, namely in Europe, crisis relatively 
understudied field. Thus, the main intention of this study is to compare the 
pricing of AS bonds between the U.S. market and W.E. market (Euro zone and 
the UK) and also in what extent the financial crisis affected the pricing of these 
operations.  
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From 2000 to 2016, with special insights from 2008 to 2016, that represents the 
end of our sample of AS bonds, we intend to understand what impact the ECB 
policies and the financial crisis had (adding other variables such as credit rating 
and other controls) on the pricing of this operations.  
Considering the previous literature on the pricing characteristics of corporate 
bonds, this research project intends to contribute to the literature by raising the 
following questions: 
1. How do common pricing characteristics compare between AS bonds in the 
United States (U.S.) and Western Europe (W.E.)? 
2. Is the credit spread on AS bonds in the U.S. higher than the credit spread on 
AS bonds in W.E.? 
3. To what extent are AS bonds issued in the U.S. and W.E. priced by common 
factors? 
4. Are the credit spread and pricing processes of AS bonds significantly affected 
by the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt 
crisis? 
5.  What was the impact of the Central Banks’ Quantitative Easing programmes 
on AS bond credit spreads? 
 
The structure of this work is designed as follows. Next section (section 2) 
presents the literature review, where the extant theoretical and empirical works 
about securitization are reviewed. In section 3, the hypotheses to be carried out 
in this study are presented, as well as the description of the variables chosen to 
perform the empirical analyses. Section 4 provides a descriptive statistics of AS 
bonds, a description of the U.S. and W.E. markets as well as a detailed analysis 
of the credit spread. In section 5, the results of the empirical analyses are 
presented and discussed and some robustness checks are also presented and 
discussed. Afterwards, in section 6,the answers to the formulated hypotheses are 
 21 
presented. Finally, in section 7, the main conclusions are presented, along with 
some gaps that can be used in future studies about securitization. 
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1 Literature Review 
1.1 What is asset securitization? 
Asset securitization is a form of structured finance “… where monetary assets 
with predictable cash flows are pooled and sold to a specially created third party 
that has borrowed money to finance the purchase.” [Roever and Fabozzi (2003)]. 
The financial assets and the respective cash flows, after being pooled together, 
are converted into negotiable securities to be sold in the market; i.e., it is a 
technique used to transform illiquid assets into securities [Fabozzi et al. (2006) 
and Pinto (2014)] and it  can be done in two ways. 
On the one hand, we have the most used securitization process (funded 
securitization), in which a bank or a financial institution creates a Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV) or a Special Purpose Entity (SPE), where it allocates its financial 
assets as well as their respective cash flows, with the purpose of taking out these 
assets from its balance sheet by selling them to the SPV. The objective with this 
strategy is to increase liquidity, reduce funding costs and improve risk 
management. 
On the other hand, the synthetic securitization process is also used, and in this 
case, the sale of assets to the SPV does not happen, since the underlying assets 
remain on the balance sheet of the originator, and only the risk of that assets is 
transferred to the SPV, by buying credit default swaps and other derivatives over 
these assets (Tasca and Zambelli, 2005). Henceforth, according to the fact that in 
this method of securitization the sale of assets does not take place, the seller does 
not receive any cash flows and the SPV is not the owner of the pool of assets but, 
indeed, the entity that supports the credit risk. 
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According to Pinto (2014), in this form of structured finance, the key element 
is that the obligation that the issuer has to repay investors is backed by the value 
of a pool of financial assets or credit support provided by a third party to the 
transaction. 
1.2 Asset securitization structures and securities 
In a typical securitization transaction, we have the transfer of assets from the 
originator to the SPV, “which then issues securities in the form of debt 
instruments, to be placed in the market through a private or public offering” 
(Joao M. Pinto, 2014). In order to better perceive the securitization transaction 
process, Figure 1.1 shows a simple diagram with the main asset and cash flow 
transfer between the parties involved. 
Note: Adapted from Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Tasca and Zambelli (2005) and Pinto (2014) 
 
In this figure we can see two essential deals: the asset sale (1) and the issuance 
of securities (2). To better detail the elementary securitization process, it is 
actually divided in four distinct steps: the originator sells the assets (loans, 
mortgages, etc) to the SPV (1); the SPV converts these assets into negotiable 
securities to be sold in the market (2); these securities have as collateral the assets 
bought by the SPV to the originator (3); the interests, principal and other cash 
Figure 1.1.: Financial flows in a securitization transaction 
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flows generated by the assets are used to repay the investors that bought the 
negotiable securities (4). In addition, the securitization process has to be analysed 
before the issuance of securities. Thus we have the following steps before the 
issuance: “assessing the collateral (1); modelling cash flows (2); quantifying risk 
factors via stress tests or other techniques (3); and structuring the transaction, 
taking into account some factors as the client’s specifications, the type of assets, 
the rating agencies’ opinion, the availability of data, and the investor’s interest in 
the deal (4)” (Joao M. Pinto, 2014). 
In Figure 1.2, is possible to understand the whole securitization process. 
Note: Adapted from Pinto (2014) 
 
Detailing the image, in Step 1: the originator creates a pool of assets in order 
to start the securitization process; Step 2: the created pool of assets is sold to the 
SPV (this happens in all types of securitization types except synthetic 
securitization); Step 3: the SPV is now the owner of the pool of assets and the 
proceeds obtained from its issued securities guarantee the payment of those 
assets; Step 4: the securities are branched into tranches according to the rating 
Figure 1.2.: Basic securitization process 
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and  they can start being traded; Step 5: the investors that buy these securities 
divided into tranches, normally institutional ones, pay to acquire the securities; 
Step 6: the SPV receives the money paid by issuing the securities and the cash 
flows are transferred to the issuer as of the initial purchase of the pool of assets 
(Joao M. Pinto, 2014). 
In Step 4, when the securities are structured into different classes, according 
to its rating, the highest rating for Class A (the most senior class) is explained by 
the division of assets according to the risk of default of the originator and the 
employment of credit enhancement strategies. (Joao M. Pinto, 2014)  
As an example of a strategy of credit enhancement we have the creation of a 
credit risk mitigation instruments by subordination of Classes B, C, D…, in which 
those lower classes provide credit support to class A. Indeed, the entire 
transaction is structured to meet specific investor’s needs.  
For instance, if the cash flows generated by the assets are not sufficient to 
remunerate investors, then the mot junior tranches, with low underlying credit 
ratings, are the first to assume the initial credit losses, protecting the most senior 
classes of the potential losses, through a subordination credit enhancement 
mechanism.   
To improve credit rating, internal or external credit enhancement mechanisms 
are needed. Additionally, the amount of necessary enhancement is determined 
according to each transaction specifications by the credit rating agency. In this 
case, for rated transactions the amount of enhancement required to perform the 
transaction is related to the level of the expected losses. For example, triple A 
tranches will require an enhancement of four/five times the level of expected 
losses and triple B would just need an enhancement of two times the expected 
losses. These mechanisms aim to protect the investors against the risk of the 
collateral not being repaid. 
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For instance, external credit enhancement mechanisms are provided by third-
party guarantees, providing first loss protection against losses up to a certain 
amount. Examples of external credit mechanisms are: guarantees, letters of credit 
and bond insurance. On the other hand, we have internal credit enhancement 
mechanisms such as: subordination; overcollateralization; cash reserves and 
accounts; excess spread; trigger events; and minimum debt or interest service 
coverage levels (Joao M. Pinto, 2014).  
The goal of these mechanisms, is to help the issuer finding the one that suits it 
better in order to reduce the cost of funds, or to target specific investors. Thus, it 
is normal for issuers to change the type of credit enhancement mechanisms from 
one deal to another according to their willingness. The issuer always faces the 
trade-off between the cost of enhancement versus the reduction in yield required 
to sell the securities. 
1.2.1 Structures 
As mentioned, securitization can be implemented in two ways: (1) a real sale 
of assets, in which the underlying assets are sold by a financial institution to the 
SPV via a true sale and by doing this assets are removed from the balance sheet; 
(2) a synthetic securitization, where the underlying assets remain in the balance 
sheet of the originator, and only the risk of the underlying assets is transferred to 
the SPV, by buying credit default swaps and other credit derivatives over these 
assets (Tasca and Zambelli, 2005). Thus, in this second securitization structure, 
the originator does not receive any cash flows, because the asset sale does not 
take place and the SPV is not the owner of the assets, but is the entity carrying 
the credit risk of those assets. 
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1.2.2 Classes of securities  
The asset securitization market is divided in three main classes (Blum and 
Diangelo, 2008; Fabozzi and Choudhry, 2004; Vink and Thibeault, 2008): asset-
backed securities (ABS), backed by consumer-backed products; mortgage-
backed securities (MBS), backed by mortgages; and collateralized debt 
obligations (CDO), backed by debt obligations.  
CDOs are a type of securitization in which a SPV issues bonds or notes backed 
by debt obligations such investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds, 
emerging market bonds, MBS, ABS, bank loans, special-situation loans and 
distressed debt, and other CDO.  
Asset-backed securities are bonds or notes backed by financial assets such as: 
credit card receivables, auto loans, manufactured-housing contracts and home-
equity loans. 
Mortgage-backed securities are bonds or notes secured by home and other real 
estate loans. 
In Figure 1.3., it is presented the securitization process divided by 
securitization instruments. 
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Note: Adapted from Pinto (2014) 
 
1.3 Advantages and disadvantages of using asset 
securitization 
To understand the advantages and disadvantages of securitization we have to 
go back to the Modigliani and Miller (1958) capital structure irrelevance theorem. 
In this world, securitization would not exist because securitization transactions 
would not bring advantages over other alternatives, since the funding cost would 
be the same and investors would have to support higher costs related with the 
structuring process and credit enhancement mechanisms. If we take as an 
example a world where perfect and liquid financial markets exist, asymmetric 
information is not an issue, then the securitization process does not add value 
and consequently, the firm’s financing structure is irrelevant. From the above 
explanation we can conclude that using securitization is a good strategy to create 
Figure 1.3.: Securitization instruments 
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value by reducing the net costs in an economy that has market imperfections as 
asymmetric information, agency conflicts and market incompleteness. Hence, the 
use of tranching and off-balance sheet financing makes sense (Joao M. Pinto, 
2014). 
Moreover, since securitization is done off balance-sheet (with the exception of 
synthetic securitization) through an SPV, we can have a scenario in which the 
securities of the SPV are rated investment grade, and the rating of the originator 
is speculative grade. Simultaneously, since the issuer no more bears the interest 
rate risk and credit risk associated to the pool of assets, it can reduce its cost of 
funding. 
1.3.1 Advantages 
After the conclusion that in a world with market imperfections securitization 
adds value, it is important to understand why. According to the existing 
literature, the core reasons for the emergence of securitization transactions are: 
(i) increasing liquidity and funding (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987; Hess and 
Smith, 1988; Jobst, 2005; Krebsz, 2011; Pavel and Phillis., 1987; Roever and 
Fabozzi, 2003; Sarkisyan, Casu, et al., 2009); (ii) reducing the cost of funding 
(Calomiris and Mason, 2004; Davidson, 2003; Fabozzi and Kothari, 2007; Fabozzi, 
Davis, et al., 2006; Goldberg and Rogers, 1988; Jobst, 2005); (iii) allowing 
originators to diversify funding sources (Davidson, 2003; Fabozzi and Kothari, 
2007; Jones, 2000; Krebsz, 2011; Roever and Fabozzi, 2003); (iv) improving 
originator’s risk – credit, interest rate, and prepayment risks - management 
(Cumming, 1987; Davidson, 2003; Fabozzi and Kothari, 2007; Goldberg and 
Rogers, 1988; Hess and Smith, 1988; Jobst, 2005; Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988); 
(v) increasing the segmentation between the origination and investment 
functions (Davidson, 2003); (vi) allowing originators to benefit from regulatory 
and/or tax arbitrage (Cumming, 1987; Davidson, 2003; Jones, 2000; Krebsz, 2011); 
and (vii) allowing originators to improve key financial ratios (Fabozzi and 
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Kothari, 2007; Goldberg and Rogers, 1988; Krebsz, 2011; Roever and Fabozzi, 
2003). 
However, these motivations can change regarding if we are analyzing the 
perspective of a bank or a non-bank corporation. As stated by Fabozzi (Fabozzi, 
Davis, et al., 2006), the principal reasons a non-bank corporation may prefer to 
issue ABS are: (i) to reduce funding costs; (ii) to diversify funding sources; (iii) 
and to accelerate earnings for financial reporting purposes. Moreover, Lupica (L. 
R. Lupica, 1998) also presents the following motivations: (i) improving liquidity; 
(ii) lowering the effective interest rate; (iii) improving risk management; and (iv) 
achieving accounting-related advantages. 
On the other hand, for a bank corporation, the motivations to use 
securitization transactions are the following: (i) new sources of funding 
(Cardone-Riportella, Samaniego-Medina, et al., 2010; Fabozzi, Davis, et al., 2006; 
Goldberg and Rogers, 1988; Jones, 2000; Loutskina and Strahan, 2009); (ii) risk 
management and the transfer of credit risk to fund risky financial assets and 
minimize financial distress costs (Cardone-Riportella, Samaniego-Medina, et al., 
2010; Chiesa, 2008; Fabozzi, Davis, et al., 2006; Goldberg and Rogers, 1988; Jobst, 
2005); (iii) new profit opportunities, by recognizing accounting gains when the 
market value of loans exceed their book value (Affinito and Tagliaferri, 2010; 
DeMarzo, 2005; Flannery, 1989); and (iv) the adjustment of capital ratios 
(Ambrose, LaCour-Little, et al., 2005; Berger and Udell, 1991; Berger, Herring, et 
al., 1995; Calomiris and Mason, 2004; Carlstrom and Samolyk, 1995; Fabozzi, 
Davis, et al., 2006; Jagtiani, Saunders, et al., 1995; Jones, 2000). 
Turning now to the benefits of securitization from an investor’s perspective, 
Fabozzi (Fabozzi, Davis, et al., 2006) argues that securitization allows investors 
to diversify sector interest, access different risk reward profiles, and access 
sectors that are otherwise not open to them. Hence, the key benefit to investors 
is the ability of securitization to tailor risk-return profiles. This idea is 
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corroborated by Jobst (Jobst, 2005), who points out that “investors of securitized 
debt can quickly adjust their investment holdings at low transaction costs in 
response to a change of personal risk sensitivity market sentiment or 
consumption preferences”.  
1.3.2 Disadvantages 
As any other financial product, securitization also has some disadvantages. 
Asset securitization transactions are very complex and deal with a very high level 
of due diligence, negotiation, and legal procedures (Joao M. Pinto, 2014). 
Henceforth, it is costlier to implement than a normal corporate bond issuance. 
Cardone Riportella (Cardone-Riportella, Samaniego-Medina, et al., 2010) 
mention that the disadvantages of securitization include the fixed costs of 
creating the SPV and the potential reduction in tax benefits, that the originators 
would have if they kept the assets on the balance sheet and financing them with 
debt, whereas while setting up a SPV they will lose some tax shields. Similarly, 
Jobst (Jobst, 2005) states that the structural complexity is the major problem in 
this type of structured finance. Indeed, the matters that should worry the 
originators are: “high accumulation of interest rate risks; the potential for errors 
in the rating and pricing of complex security designs; and the shortcomings of 
analytical models for assessing risks”.  
Another commonly mentioned disadvantage is the fact that the link between 
the borrower and the bank is disconnected, because the bank creates a SPV/SPE 
to move the assets from its balance sheet to this entity. When this happens, the 
bank has an incentive to be less risk conscious. Moreover, aligning this risk 
careless with the fact that the bank depends on its investors to fund its loans, 
mostly the commercial paper investors, this could lead to the reduction of the 
number of investors and consequently the funding amount. Additionally, 
another shortcoming brought by securitization was the increase of leverage 
ratios, in some cases 1:40 or even 1:50, which at the minimum failure of some 
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payments the entities that sold these products would have losses, for example 
the failure on a payment on a mortgage (Choudhry and Landuyt, 2009). This 
aligned with the overestimated liquidity of the assets given as collateral to the 
securitized products (as an example a house as a collateral to a MBS) could result 
in a collapse of the market. 
In general, the literature points out the following problems related to 
securitization: (i) complexity (Caselli and Gatti, 2005; Davidson, 2003a; Fabozzi, 
Davis, et al., 2006; Fender, Mitchell, et al., 2005; Jobst, 2005); (ii) off-balance sheet 
treatment (Fabozzi, Davis, et al., 2006; Rutledge and Raynes, 2010); (iii) 
asymmetric information (Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011; Gorton, Gorton, et 
al., 2008; Jobst, 2009; Keys, Mukherjee, et al., 2010; Krebsz, 2011; L. Lupica, 2009; 
Purnanandam, 2011); (iv) agency problems (Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011; 
Fabozzi and Kothari, 2007; Jobst, 2005, 2009; Purnanandam, 2011); and (v) higher 
transaction costs (Cardone-Riportella, Samaniego-Medina, et al., 2010; Davidson, 
2003). 
1.4 Asset Securitization and the 2007/2008 financial crisis 
Securitization process started in the early 1970s, in the United States, with the 
sale of pooled mortgage loans guaranteed by government agencies (Moody’s, 
2003). The government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) was 
established in 1968 after Fannie Mae was privatized. The main objective of this 
government institution is to enlarge funding for mortgages that are insured by 
other federal agencies. Indeed, through the use of securitization techniques, 
when these mortgages are converted into negotiable securities and placed in the 
market to be sold, Ginnie Mae provides credit guarantee on those securities, 
creating a less risky product for investors, and increasing the demand for these 
products. With the guarantee from the government, investors felt more 
comfortable to invest on issued securities, and this was the main reason why we 
 34 
noticed the fast growing of the securitization technique until the beginning of 
2007, in the U.S. 
Actually, after the 9/11 we noticed further growth in the application of this 
technique, not just as cash securitization transactions, but also synthetic 
securitization transactions. It had a rapid growth from 2002- 2006, but in 2007 this 
market languished. In roughly terms what happened was that banks gave credit, 
namely mortgages, to clients with no jobs and no sources of income; i.e., with a 
higher credit risk. Subsequently, financial institutions pooled that loans and 
mortgages together and sold them to a SPV in order to get fast liquidity and 
funding. The financial institutions did it because to receive the entire money of a 
mortgage would take 30 years or more, whereas by selling the mortgage to an 
SPV, banks anticipate those cash flows to grant more credit. Afterwards, in the 
SPV the loans are converted into negotiable securities. For instance, bonds are 
divided into tranches according to the riskiness of the loans and mortgages, being 
the more junior tranches the ones to assume the first loss in case of default and 
the senior ones the last to lose. Being aware that these bonds were collateralized 
with mortgages given to clients with a high probability of not repaying the 
credits, we arrived to the origination of the financial crisis. Indeed, some of the 
mortgage borrowers started to not paying the principal and the interest and 
banks started to get the houses as a counterpart. With a high number of clients 
not paying the mortgages and banks accumulating real estate buildings without 
the ability to sell them the investors that bought the MBS, ABS and CDOSs started 
to face losses, and after that the whole economy started to collapse.  Correlated 
with the subprime crisis, where mortgages not conforming to the government’s 
requirements in terms of credit quality and size, were not sold with the 
government sponsored entities and were actually sold in secondary markets, 
originating subprime mortgages, and reflecting a high value of mortgages 
relatively to house prices, dictate the collapse of the market when the price of the 
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houses started to reduce (Coval, Jurek, et al., 2009). Moreover, with direct 
influence in the defaults of some entities like Lehman Brothers, the image of 
securitized products was severely tarnished during the crisis (Choudhry and 
Landuyt, 2009).  
The same authors (Choudhry and Landuyt, 2009), pointed out some factors 
that contributed to the fall in confidence in the market since 2007, due to 
securitization. 
Firstly “the flexibility and wide application of the securitization 
technique”, gave banks the possibility to move assets off the balance sheet, which 
allowed banks to sell low-quality assets like sub-prime mortgages to investors 
who had little knowledge about the credit risk they were getting. This is known 
in the finance literature as asymmetric information. In this case, the bank that has 
the loans knows much more about the risks associated to that loans than the 
investors that would buy bonds collateralized by those assets, which gives a 
strong advantage to the bank. 
 Secondly, in securitization the link between the borrower and the bank is 
separated. Hence, there is a less incentive for the bank to be risk conscious. In a 
normal bank regime, banks should have a minimum loan to deposits ratio, but 
this do not apply if they get rid of some loans by selling them to a SPV. This turns 
out to be an agency problem, because the originator loses the interest on the pool 
of assets in the moment they are sold to the SPV. Since the assets do not belong 
to the issuer anymore, the originator starts to be careless when it evaluates the 
creditworthiness of its customers, because even if the client has a bad rating the 
losses on those assets do not impact the balance sheet of the issuer(Iacobucci and 
Winter, 2005; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The amount of leverage in the SPVs at the time was very high. The normal 
leverage was 1:15, but some SPVs had leverage ratios of 1:40 and even 1:50. This 
led to a fail of hundreds of SPVs. 
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Furthermore, some of these products became very complex and difficult to 
analyse by outsiders. As an example, the correlation risk within the credit 
portfolio became very difficult to measure, which made more difficult the pricing 
of the securitized securities. 
Also, the credit rating agencies, used complex methodologies to give credit 
ratings, that were not understood by all investors. Additionally, they gave very 
optimistic ratings to certain deals. 
Finally, the liquidity of the majority of the securitized assets was 
overestimated. For instance, the liquidity of an AAA-rated securitized paper was 
believed by investors to be the same as the liquidity of a plain vanilla AAA-rated 
paper and consequently, it could be easily funded by highly liquid commercial 
paper. 
With all the problems of the securitization technique referred above, being the 
financial institutions exposed to the subprime mortgage marked we arrived to a 
financial crisis, due to the role played by the structure finance market. In 
addition, Criado and Rixtel (Criado and Rixtel, 2008) pointed out that banks 
abused in the use of structured finance products and putting them out of the 
balance sheet. Additionally, they also had a large exposure to CDOs.  
Since the image of the securitized products was completely damaged after the 
financial crisis, some authors (Choudhry and Landuyt, 2009), pointed out some 
recommendations in order to restore the market confidence in this kind of 
financial products, such as: establishing a securitization forum of interest parties, 
in which the main market entities, as an example banks, investors and regulators 
review the state of the market and make recommendations for change to which 
all new transactions would adhere and also monitor the current legislation; re-
couple the de-coupling (not direct intermediation between lender and borrower 
during the transaction, because of the use of a SPV/SPE), that is the major pitfall 
of securitization, with the objective to make the lender more risk consciousness; 
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restore the credibility of the rating agencies, by trying to give more transparency 
as well as neutrality, and the performance of these agencies should not be based 
in the number of issued ratings, but instead on the quality of the ratings given; 
review of credit rating methodology, in order to be more understandable by 
investors.  
1.5 Western European markets versus the US market 
According to Tasca and Zambelli (Tasca and Zambelli, 2005)  the concept of 
asset securitization was introduced in the US financial system in the 1970s. From 
then until the introduction of the Euro in 1999 this market had a small growth, 
especially in Europe. Although, after that introduction the importance of the 
European securitization market increased, leading to a rapid growth until the 
beginning of the financial crisis in 2007. 
The main difference between the European and the much larger and 
developed US market, is that in the US the main promoter of securitization 
transactions was the government, that had the goal to encourage home 
ownership and create a secondary market for mortgages. By contrast, in Europe, 
the government did not intervene in order to promote securitization.  Indeed, in 
Europe, the first MBS were issued by large commercial banks with the objectives 
of regulatory arbitrage, diversification of funding sources, and as a response to 
the appeal of international investors (Joao M. Pinto, 2014). 
In addition, the fact that the European market is divided into a large number 
of countries with different legislations, in contrast to the US market, led to a more 
complicated legal setup as well as more upfront costs to be supported by the 
originators. As stated by Adams (Adams, 2005), the wide divergence in market 
sizes within Europe is a reflection of the very different economic, financial, 
political, historical, legal, and social frameworks. 
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Finally, Adams (Adams, 2005) mentions some more differences between the 
European and the US market: 
1. Lack of uniformity in the structures and the definitions used in the 
European ABS markets, since there are no definitions for concepts such 
as: prime, conforming, non-conforming, or jumbo loans. Missing of 
agencies in the European market like Fannie Mae1 and Freddie Mac1 
operating in the US. 
2. Absence of credit score in the European countries. In contrast to the US 
market, there is no credit score acceptance in Europe like FICO score2 
in the US. There are some credit reference agencies in Europe that 
developed their scores, however these scores are not used by finance 
companies. 
3. European investors have lower propensity to borrow than consumers 
in the US. 
4. In terms of default, European consumers are, in general, less likely to 
default in their debts than the US consumers. This is explained by the 
fact that in Europe bankruptcy is regarded more seriously, and the 
financial impact of bankruptcy tends to be more severe. Moreover, the 
legal systems in Europe support more the lender. 
5. The prepayment risk that has a more important role in the US rather 
than in Europe. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government sponsored enterprises that buy mortgages from lenders, poll 
them together and sell them as mortgage-backed securities to investors 
 
2 Fico Scores are a global standard for measuring credit risk in the banking, mortgage, credit card, auto and 
retail industries. 
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1.6 The pricing determinants of AS bonds 
The literature on the pricing of AS bonds is scant when compared with the 
abundant literature regarding corporate bonds spread determinants. In this 
section we present the empirical literature on the pricing of corporate bonds as 
they are important to understand what factors can affect the spread of AS bonds 
with the goal to create a background to understand the pricing of AS transactions. 
Additionally, the AS market is composed by ABS, MBS, and CDOs. Since we 
have differences in the assets related to these securities, the relevant pricing 
factors for these securities should differ, too (Vink and Thibeault, 2008). 
Gabbi and Sironi (Gabbi and Sironi, 2005) show that credit ratings are the most 
important factor determining the spreads between the yield to maturity of 
corporate bonds and that of equivalent Treasury securities. Furthermore, the 
issuance spreads of corporate bonds issued in Europe over the corresponding 
maturity Treasury bonds reflect investors’ perception of the risk and of the bond 
primary and secondary market efficiency and liquidity conditions. Henceforth, 
they are a function of five main factors: (i) the bond issuer default risk; (ii) the 
bond’s expected recovery rate in case of default; (iii) the expected liquidity of the 
secondary market of the bond issue; (iv) the expected tax treatment to which 
investors will be subject; and (v) the bond’s primary market efficiency conditions. 
They concluded that among those five factors (determinants of the pricing), 
ratings of corporate bonds are the most important factor to determine the credit 
spreads, along with the bond’s expected tax treatment. However, the primary 
market efficiency and the secondary market liquidity turned out to be poor 
explanatory variables. In this study the authors carried out an analysis of the 
spreads in the primary market, since the liquidity in the secondary market is 
poor. 
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Moreover, (Elton, Gruber, et al., 2001) state that the “spreads in rates between 
corporate and government bonds differ across rating classes and should be 
positive for each rating class”. They pointed out three factors that may increase 
the spread on corporate bonds: (i) expected default loss, meaning that the 
investors require a premium to compensate this expected loss in comparison to 
the non-defaulting government securities; (ii) tax premium, yields that the capital 
gains on corporate bonds are taxed whereas interest payments on government 
bonds are not; (iii) risk premium, stating that the return on corporate bonds is 
riskier than the return on government bonds, because a considerable part of the 
risk on corporate bonds is systematic. Although, some authors do not corroborate 
factors two and three3, by assuming that the spread is all default premium. To 
cast doubt on this opposite literature, Elton (Elton, Gruber, et al., 2001) found that 
taxes and risk premiums represent a large part of corporate bonds pricing 
determinants. Beyond the credit rating as being the most important pricing 
determinant the literature also points out liquidity (Bao, Pan, et al., 2011; Chen, 
Lesmond, et al., 2007; Longstaff, Pan, et al., 2011), systematic risk (Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein, et al., 2001; Elton, Gruber, et al., 2001), incomplete 
accounting information (Flannery, Nikolova, et al., 2012), leverage (Flannery, 
Nikolova, et al., 2012) and taxes (Elton, Gruber, et al., 2001) as another important 
pricing factors. Moreover, macroeconomic variables such as the reference interest 
rates, the yield curves, the volatility in the market also can affect the credit spread 
of an AS bond(Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Krishnan, Ritchken, et al., 2005). 
Finally, the characteristics of the issuance, such as: maturity, tranche size, 
transaction size and the year of the issuance also contribute to influence the credit 
spread. Putting all these findings together the previous literature found that ABS, 
                                                 
3 Some authors assume a zero risk premium, and state that the only price determinant of the spread of a 
corporate bond is the expected default 
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MBS and CDOs are influenced by the same pricing determinants, though in a 
different way(Vink and Thibeault, 2008). 
Turning now to the pricing of securitized products, the academic literature 
contains few AS bond pricing studies. Maris and Segal (Maris and Segal, 2002) 
found that default probability, tranche size, transaction size, and year of issuance 
influence credit spreads for commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). In 
addition, for CMBS, (An, Deng, et al., 2010) it was concluded that interest rate 
volatility, the yield curve slope, and the property type composition of the 
underlying asset pool have a significant impact on credit spreads. Rothberg 
(Rothberg, Nothaft, et al., 1989) corroborates that interest rate volatility  affects 
the pricing of AS bonds and adds that liquidity, credit risk and the term structure 
of interest rates also affects significantly the pricing of the mentioned securities. 
Furthermore, Ammer and Clinton (Ammer and Clinton, 2004) argue that credit 
rating is the most important pricing factor for AS bonds. This research is 
confirmed by other literature studies (Buscaino, Caselli, et al., 2012; Hu and 
Cantor, 2007; Vink and Thibeault, 2008). 
As can be perceived by comparing the pricing of corporate bonds with the 
pricing of securitized bonds, the main price determinant for both is the credit 
rating.  
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2 Hypotheses and Sample Selection 
2.1  Hypotheses 
The primary goal of this work is to compare the differences between the 
pricing of AS bonds in the Western European (W.E.) versus the United States 
(U.S.) market. Henceforth, regarding the five research questions presented in the 
introduction, we can formulate 3 hypotheses: 
1. Credit spreads and pricing characteristics differ significantly between AS 
bonds issued in the U.S. versus W.E. 
2. AS bonds credit spread is higher in the U.S. than in W.E. 
3. The 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign 
debt crisis affected significantly AS bonds credit spread and pricing 
determinants. 
 
On the first hypotheses, we will use a univariate analysis to begin the study of 
the differences in the credit spread as well as the pricing factors of AS bonds in 
both markets, the U.S. and W.E. Therefore, we will take conclusions about the 
main pricing factors of AS bonds in both markets. 
The second hypothesis, comes up from the previous finding in the literature 
and also analysing the data (further on explained in the Credit Spread Analysis 
section), that corroborate the idea that the credit spread for AS bonds issued in 
the U.S. have increased during and after the crisis period in comparison to the 
before crisis period. In fact, we already expect an increase of the credit spreads 
on these securities in the U.S. and in W.E. after 2007, however the main goal of 
the second research question is to observe and explain the different credit spreads 
for the same securities issued in the U.S. and in W.E. Additionally, there is an 
intent to see which market was more affected by the financial crisis in terms of 
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credit spreads, and why we had different credit spreads between the two 
analysed markets. The answer to this hypothesis starts once more with the 
univariate analysis, in which we compare the average credit spread of our sample 
between AS bonds types (ABS, MBS, and CDOs) and deal region (U.S. and W.E.). 
Finally, in the third hypotheses, we want to examine the impact of the financial 
crisis in the credit spreads of each security type and also the impact that this crisis 
had in each analysed market. It is expected that the credit spread of these 
securities increase in the aftermath of the financial crisis, with more intensity in 
the U.S. In order to study this impact, we intend to build a univariate analysis 
table in which we calculate the mean of the credit spread and the variables that 
determine it, before (from January 2000 to September of 2008) and during the 
crisis periods (from September 2008 to December 2016). Afterwards, we intend 
to run OLS regressions for pre-crisis and crisis periods. 
 
2.2 Sample Selection 
2.2.1 Databases 
The sample of ABS, MBS, and CDOs used was extracted from DCM analytics 
database, within the period of January 1st, 2000 to December 31st, 2016. Beyond 
the date criterion, the sample was also filtered by nationality of risk (similar to 
deal nationality), by selecting bonds issued by originators located in the U.S., 
U.K. and Euro Area countries. The issuers of AS bonds that we chose to the 
sample are only banks.  
Macroeconomic data like the risk-free rate for both Europe and the US, market 
volatility, Libor US, Libor UK, Euribor, and government yields (Germany, UK, 
and the US) were obtained from Bloomberg. Finally, accounting and market 
variables from the originators, such as total assets, ROA, ROE, loans, customer 
deposits, capital ratios and equity value, were extracted from Bankscope.  
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2.2.2 Description of variables 
 
Credit Spread (Dependent Variable) 
Credit spread was used as the dependent variable and represents the pricing 
of the financial product. The credit spread consists in the difference between the 
yield to maturity (YTM) of the tranche and the corresponding Government yield 
(with the same maturity of the deal) on the issuance date; i.e., the option adjusted 
spread (Elton, Gruber, et al., 2001). 
The sample of credit spread was divided into two big categories, fixed rate 
and floating rate notes. From the initial sample, the following issue types were 
removed: fixed rate converting to floating, fixed rate extendible and floating rate 
note extendible.  
 We only use deals with a deal currency code of in EUR, GBP, and USD and 
government yields of the US, the UK, and Germany. By doing this we avoided 
the forex effect. As an example, for a deal made in Europe in USD we used the 
US respective government yield (according to issuance date and maturity dates) 
to subtract from the YTM of the tranche. 
 
Adjusted Spread 
To improve the comparison of credit spreads between fixed rate and floating 
rate issuances, we use the adjusted spread. It is necessary to account, in credit 
spread computation, for the fact that the fixed rate bond carries the interest rate 
risk, whereas a floater--quoted as a spread relative to a benchmark (e.g., Libor) -
-does not. Hence, to ensure comparability of spreads at issuance we converted 
floating rate bonds to fixed rates using fixed-for-floating rate swaps. This 
conversion was implemented individually for each bond, using the appropriate 
quote for the swap matching the maturity of the bond and taken at the issuance 
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date. We also consider the specific interest rate market (EUR Libor, USD Libor 
and GBP Libor) and even different reference rates within the same market (USD 
Libor 1M, USD Libor 3M, USD Libor 6M, and USD Libor 12M). 
 
Country Risk 
This variable is a proxy of country rating estimated by Standard & Poor’s. The 
scale goes from 1 to 22. The value of 1 means that the rating of the country where 
the deal took place was AAA at the time of issuance. The scale continues until 
the number 22, matching the rating DD. Hence, a positive coefficient in this 
variable is expected, since countries with lower score (higher rating) have lower 
risk. From the previous literature we can point out Zaghini study (Zaghini, 2014), 
in which he states that a positive effect on spread is expected since banks 
headquartered in countries with lower risk tend to give a special protection in 
default. 
 
Credit Rating 
Credit rating measures the credit risk given by Standard & Poor’s to the deal’s 
tranche at the time of issuance. As in country risk the range of values goes from 
1 to 22, in which an AAA rating gets a value of 1 and a DD rating gets a value of 
22. As it can be perceived, the higher the value is, the lower the rating is given. 
In the previous studies (Gabbi and Sironi, 2005; Zaghini, 2014) the relationship 
between credit rating and credit spread was analysed and was it was found that: 
credit rating is the most important determinant of credit spread; and the higher 
the credit risk, meaning a higher score in the rating scale, turns out to increase 
the value of the credit spread, creating a positive relationship between these two 
variables. 
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Rated 
As another measure of the Rating of a tranche this variable intends to 
distinguish between rated and not rated tranches. In, fact according to the 
previous literature of rating, described in the last variable analysis is possible to 
see that if rating is downgraded the credit spread increases. Henceforth, since a 
not rated bond is considered for the market to be more expected to default in 
comparison to a rated one, because it does not have a credit rating, the 
expectation is that when we compare a rated bond with a not rated one the credit 
spread for the not rated one be higher than for the rated one. 
 
Maturity 
This variable represents the time until maturity of the bonds in years. Ceteris 
Paribus, bonds with longer maturities tend to be riskier than the ones with 
shorter maturities, because it gets more difficult to forecast with accuracy the 
future cash flows. Consequently, the demanded spread for longer maturities 
tend to be higher. From the previous empirical studies regarding asset 
securitization bonds (Vink and Thibeault, 2008), we have evidence that a 
significant negative relationship between spread and CDOs yields with a 
maturity lower than 5 years, and the same relationship occurs in MBSs with a 
maturity longer than 15 years. For ABS these authors did not find any significant 
relationship between maturity and credit spread. Henceforth, it is difficult to 
forecast the variable sign. 
 
Government Yield 
For the Government Yield variable, the difference between the issuer country 
10yrs Government Yield (long-term) and the 3mth Government Yield (short-
term) was applied. We expected that an increase on this yield’s difference, related 
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to an increase on the credit risk, and a not linear yield curve, result in an increase 
of the credit spreads (Barrios and European Commission. Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs., 2009). 
 
Subordinated Debt 
This variable takes the value one if the tranche represents a debt owed to an 
unsecured creditor, which means that in a scenario of default, this creditor can 
only be paid after the claims of secured creditors have been paid. Therefore, as 
this means more risk for this kind of issuance, we expect an increase in the credit 
spread for subordinated debt tranches. 
 
GDP per capita 
The above variable is a macroeconomic one, that in a general level measures 
the average income of the citizens of a country. Thus, as this average income 
increases, we expect the country to be a more developed one. More developed 
countries have less risk associated, consequently we expect lower credit spreads 
for AS bonds issuances in countries where the GDP per capita is higher. In other 
words, we expect a negative correlation between credit spread and GDP per 
capita. 
 
Creditor Rights 
To use this variable, we extracted the Laporta’s Creditor Rights scale (La Porta, 
Lopez‐de‐Silanes, et al., 1998). From previous studies (João M Pinto, 2018), in 
which was found that countries with better creditor rights have more probability 
to issue structured finance debt such as Project Finance loans, rather than straight 
debt funding. Therefore, we expect that countries with a higher level of creditor 
rights have more AS bond issuances with lower credit spreads. 
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Risk Free Rate  
This variable intends to be a proxy for the general levels of interest rates. We 
used two different types of interest rates. For the European market, we use the 
three-month German Treasury bill (Risk free WE) and for the US market we used 
the three-month US bill (Risk free US). Both risk free rates were used with the 
values at the time of the issuance of the bonds. Some authors (Eichengreen and 
Mody, 1998;Kamin and von Kleist, 1999) state that the general level of interest 
rates is an important determinant of the bond’s pricing. The à-priori expectation 
is that the risk free rate will have a significant negative impact on credit spreads, 
because higher yields are associated with a better  and growing economy and so, 
lower probabilities of default (Collin-Dufresn, Goldstein, and Martin, 2001; 
Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton, 2011). 
 
Volatility   
Volatility means the change in the value of an asset and reflects a measure of 
uncertainty and risk. In order to measure this variable, the closing values for the 
US Volatility Index (VIX) were used as a proxy. US VIX is a negatively correlated 
index with the S&P 500, and we expect a positively correlation between US VIX 
and the credit spread. As it is stated by the literature until now, higher volatility, 
means higher risk, and that leads to a higher risk premium demand (Collin-
Dufresn et al., 2001; Davidson, 2003; Fabozzi and Kothari, 2007; Pinto, 2013). 
 
Number of banks 
The number of banks involved in the deal can influence the deal’s risk. For 
instance, if we have a deal involving a broad number of banks it might lower the 
spread, because investors tend to give less risk to a deal when it has certification 
from more agents. Previous analyses (Vink and Thibeault, 2008) found that credit 
spread and number of lead managers are significantly, negatively related for 
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MBS, while for ABS and CDOs they have an insignificant relationship. Therefore, 
the expectation is to have a negative influence of the variable number of banks 
on the spread (Nadauld and Weisbach, 2012; Sorge and Gadanecz, 2008a). 
 
Loan to Value (Tranche to Transaction) 
The Loan to Value is a measure that represents the ratio between the tranche 
size and the transaction size. It is gotten by dividing the tranche size over the 
transaction size. For AS bonds higher this ratio, lower the credit spread. As 
mentioned before, an example of a credit enhancement strategy consists in the 
creation of a credit risk mitigation instrument in which the lowest rating classes, 
the most junior ones (B, C, and D), provide credit support to the highest rating 
class, the most senior one (A), in order to reduce the risks transferred to investors. 
Thus, tranching is a pillar of the securitization process. 
 
Tranche Size 
The tranche size represents the tranche amount in USD. Maris and Segal 
(Maris and Segal, 2002) proved that tranche size influences negatively the CMBS 
(Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities) credit spread. Additionally, the 
previous literature (Buscaino, Caselli, Corielli, and Gatti, 2012; Cuchra, 2004; 
Sorge and Gadanecz, 2008; Vink and Thibeault, 2008) also corroborates the 
statement, in which, tranche size has a negative impact on the credit spread. 
 
Transaction Size 
This variable represents the amount in US dollars of the whole transaction. We 
expect à-priori that larger transactions are negatively correlated with credit 
spread, since higher amounts issued, require more procedures and certification, 
being riskier. 
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Number of tranches 
This variable gives the number of tranches per transaction. Having the 
transactions divided in tranches allow us to study the impact of tranching on the 
credit spread. As stated by Vink and Thibeault (Vink and Thibeault, 2008), 
“Tranching could allow the issuer to take advantage of market factors such as 
greater investor sophistication and heterogeneous screening skills related to 
asymmetric information”. Additionally, Firla-Cuchra and Jenkinson (Cuchra and 
Jenkinson, 2005), found a significant and negative relationship between the 
number of tranches and the credit spread at launch. Therefore, a negative 
coefficient for this variable is predicted. 
 
Fixed rate 
The dummy variable fixed rate is one if the bond is a fixed rate bond, and zero 
otherwise. With fixed rate issuances the bond coupons are not affected by the 
market interest rates, except if they are callable bonds and the issuer decides to 
call them back in case of lower interest rates. The expectation of the issuer by 
issuing at fixed rate is to protect itself against an increase in interest rates. 
Henceforth, the issuer has to add a premium to borrow funds at fixed rate, vis-à-
vis with floating rate issuances, so the spread for fixed rate issuances should be 
higher. Empirically, Sorge and Gadanecz (Sorge and Gadanecz, 2008) found a 
significant discount in the pricing of floating rate bonds, which can be correlated 
with the insurance premium that yields for fixed rate offers against future 
interest rate fluctuations. 
 
Currency risk 
This is another dummy variable that takes the value one if the deal’s tranche 
currency is different from the currency of the issuer and zero otherwise. Like it 
is expected à-priori, and corroborated by Vink and Thibeault (Vink and 
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Thibeault, 2008) securitized bond issues exposed to currency risk have higher 
spreads than issues without it. 
 
Callable  
Callable represents a dummy variable that is equal to one if the bond has a call 
option embedded and zero otherwise. The callability of a bond gives the issuer 
the right to redeem the bond at some point before it reaches the maturity date. 
The call price normally exceeds the issue price. As that being said, the credit 
spread should reflect this option, and so, the callability of a bond should be 
positively correlated with the credit spread (Fabozzi and Kothari, 2007). 
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3 Univariate Analysis 
3.1 Market Evolution 
Our sample of AS bonds, more specifically MBS, ABS and CDOs was extracted 
from DCM analytics with the following criteria: 
- AS bonds issued in the European Union, in the UK and in the US; 
- Issued between January 1st, 2000 and December 31st, 2016; 
- Not issued by state-owned entities 
After applying these criteria, we excluded perpetual maturity bonds, as well 
AS bonds issued by nonfinancial firms. Finally, we excluded outliers: 0.5% of the 
lowest and highest spreads and tranche sizes were excluded. 
After applying these screens, we are able to analyse 24,727 deals, 
corresponding to 84,580 tranches, worth $ 17,514 billion. We next describe further 
our sample. 
Since the purpose of this dissertation is to compare the pricing of AS bonds in 
the U.S. vis-à-vis W.E., the majority of the graphs show the differences between 
these two regions. However, as stated by the literature, the U.S. market is broader 
and larger than any other country or region in the world. By contrast the W.E. 
market is divided in Eurozone and the UK, and we can even go further and split 
the Eurozone in several countries. Thus, we also created some charts in order to 
show the differences within the W.E. market. 
Graphs displayed in figures 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, present the number of deals by 
region (U.S. vs W.E.) and security type (MBS, ABS, and CDO) throughout the 
period of analysis (2000 to 2016), as well as the amount issued by region and 
security in the same period, respectively. 
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Figure 3.1.1.: Number of deals per security and region 
 
 
Figure 3.1.2.: Amount issued in $B by security and region 
 
As expected, the U.S. market dominates in terms of number and amount. Our 
sample is in line with the previous literature findings. Also, we can see that 
between 2002 and 2007 the securitization market achieved its peak. Once more, 
this is in line with the literature about the topic that evidences the period after 
the introduction of the euro (2000) until 2007 as the “golden age” of 
securitization. 
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In terms of securities issued we can conclude that in the U.S., MBS leads not 
just in number of deals but also in amount issued followed by ABS and CDOs.  
However, in W.E. despite that the 2000-2009 period MBS represents the most 
issued AS bond type by number, from 2010 to 2016 ABS reveals to be the most 
issued AS bond. CDOs, as for the U.S. market, is the least issued security in our 
sampling period. Looking now at the amount issued in the W.E. market, it is 
possible to state that MBS dominates for all the years except in 2013 and 2014, in 
which ABS is the most issued security for this market. Again, CDOs is the 
security type with the lowest issuance amount in Europe. 
The next two charts, available in figures 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 present the same 
information as the previous two ones but now, they highlight the differences 
between the Eurozone and the U.K. markets. Both markets belong to the W.E. 
region. 
 
 
Figure 3.1.3.: Number of deals per security in W.E. 
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Figure 3.1.4.: Amount issued per security in W.E. in $B 
 
The above two graphs in contrast to the U.S. market, evidence that in the 
Eurozone and in the UK the securitization market grew in the years of 2007 and 
2008, just having a downturn in 2009 and afterwards. 
The main evidences that we can point out regarding graphs from figures 3.1.3 
and 3.1.4 are: 
- in both the UK and Eurozone, MBS is the most issued security in number 
of deals as well as in issuance amount throughout all the period of 
analysis;  
- after 2008, the most issued securities by Eurozone banks are ABS. This is 
related to the launch of the ABSPP programme by the ECB in 2014 after 
the CBPP programmes, that stimulate the issuance of ABS. 
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Table 3.1 shows the number of deals and amount issued in millions of dollars 
per country in the W.E. market between 2000 and 2016 
 
Country Deals Amount issued $M 
UK 961 1,410,110 
Germany 542 313,444 
France 233 112,377 
Italy 399 329,484 
Greece 37 56,674 
Portugal 86 78,876 
Spain 465 565,014 
Austria 17 5,617 
Belgium 25 11,959 
Cyprus 1 1,015 
Finland 8 5,131 
Ireland 90 77,823 
Latvia 1 64 
Lithuania 1 46 
Luxembourg 17 5,238 
Netherlands 271 320,436 
Table 3.1.: Number of deals and amount issued in $M per country in W.E. 
 
Analysing the table, it is possible to conclude that the UK market dominates 
in terms of volume issued within the analysed period of this sample, with 
$1,410,110 issued of ABS, MBS and CDOs. Spain is the first country in the 
Eurozone and the second in Europe (after the UK) with more AS securities 
issuances in a total amount of $565,014. Finally, to finish the top three countries 
in Europe with more dollar’s issuances we have Italy with an issuance amount 
of AS bonds of $329,484 between 2000 and 2016. 
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Finally, graphs presented in figures 3.1.5 and 3.1.6 show AS bond issuances 
per investment-grade rating class. In fact, our sample is mainly composed by 
tranches with AAA rating, because in a typical AS transaction, AAA tranche has 
a tranche to transaction ratio between 80% and 90%.  
 
 
Figure 3.1.5.: Number of tranches issued by investment grade rating categories per region 
 
 
Figure 3.1.6.: Number of tranches issued by investment grade rating categories in W.E. 
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3.2 Credit Spread Analysis 
 
As we want to examine how credit spreads and pricing characteristics 
compare between AS bonds issued in the U.S. versus W.E. as well as the common 
pricing determinants, we selected a sub-sample of bonds with available 
information on credit spreads. 
The credit spread is computed as the difference between the AS bond Yield to 
Maturity (YTM) and the government yield with the same maturity at the time of 
the issuance, the so-called option adjusted spread 
As previously mentioned, to ensure comparability of spreads at issuance we 
converted floating rate bonds to fixed rates using fixed-for-floating rate swaps. 
This conversion was implemented individually for each bond, using the 
appropriate quote for the swap matching the maturity of the bond and taken at 
the issuance date. We also consider the specific interest rate market (EUR Libor, 
USD Libor and GBP Libor) and even different reference rates within the same 
market (USD Libor 1M, USD Libor 3M, USD Libor 6M, and USD Libor 12M).  
Finally, tranches with no information about the rating were deleted. These 
procedures yielded a final sample of 66,354 tranches with the following 
information: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2.: Tranches’ details in Credit Spread Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
Rated Not 
Rated 
U.S. W.E Floating 
rate 
Fixed rate 
64,984 1,370 55,127 11,227 46,119 20,235 
98% 2% 83% 17% 70% 30% 
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From the analysis of the above table is possible to conclude that our credit 
spread sample is mainly composed by rated U.S. floating rate tranches. 
Figure 3.2.1 presents the average credit spreads per year, per region and per 
security type.  
 
 
If we analyse the global market as a whole, the period in which the credit 
spread for AS bonds was lower coincides with part of the period where we had 
the most issued amount and number of deals, that is from 2002 to 2005. 
Additionally, if we don’t consider 2016, as expected in 2007 and 2008 (financial 
crisis years) the credit spreads achieved its peak, resulting in a premium 
demanded by investors to buy these risky securities. One reason that can explain 
the increase in the credit spreads for AS bonds specially in Continental Europe is 
the end of the CBPP and ABSPP programmes taken by ECB. With the decrease 
in the demand for these securities, the pricing tends to increase. 
Furthermore, comparing the spreads of AS Bonds issued in the U.S. and W.E. 
we can realise that from 2000 to 2012 the pricing of these operations was lower in 
W.E. with exception to the years of 2001 and 2008 (financial crisis), and was 
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Figure 3.2.1.: Average credit spread in bps by region (U.S. and W.E.) 
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higher in this region after 2012 vis-à-vis with the U.S. As a matter of fact, investors 
perceived more risk in the U.S. at the time. 
The previous chart presented an initial comparison between the two markets 
under analysis during this study, although it lacks in showing the spread by 
security type. Since this study analyses three types of securities it is also 
important to figure out the differences in pricing between the securities 
throughout our period of analysis. Thus, figure 3.2.2 allows us to observe that. 
 
 
The first thing that catches the attention is that this graph has a very similar 
pattern to the previous one. Indeed, we are analysing the same variable (credit 
spread) but this time in relation to security type.  
In fact, as it was expected from the extant literature, CDOs are the security 
class with higher spreads, especially during crisis period (2007-2016).  
Comparing now ABS with MBS it is possible to perceive that between 2001 
and 2005 ABS had a lower spread than MBS, but in 2000 and after 2005 MBS 
spreads were lower than ABS ones. 
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The main goal of this research is to compare the U.S. market with the W.E. one, 
but as we all know the U.S. is a country and W.E. is a region with several 
countries. As it was done in market evolution section, the split of W.E., in this 
chapter is also important to divide the W.E. market in Eurozone and the U.K. As 
it was mentioned and showed before there is a considerable difference between 
these two markets, that can also be analysed in terms of credit spread. 
Hence, the following chart, figure 3.2.3, shows evidence on the evolution from 
2000 to 2016 of credit spreads between the U.K. and the Eurozone. 
 
 
In a first look, we can say that in the U.K. the spread for AS bonds is higher 
than in the Eurozone countries with the exception of the period from 2009 to 2013. 
Indeed, the Eurozone faced a very difficult period after the 2008 financial crisis, 
having a sovereign debt crisis. That led to the launch of three debt purchasing 
programmes by the ECB. 
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Figure 3.2.3.: Average credit spread in bps by region (U.K. and Eurozone.) 
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Another important effect that we intend to study is the impact of the 2007-2008 
financial crisis in the credit spread. Henceforth, the graph presented in figure 
3.2.4 points out the differences in pricing before and after Lehman Brother’s 
bankruptcy date for the U.S. and W.E. 
 
On the one hand, in the U.S. the credit spread for CDOs and ABS increases 
during crisis, whereas for MBS it actually decreases. 
On the other hand, if we look to the European continent we can see a reduction 
of the credit spreads across all security types, comparing the two analysed 
periods. 
Finally, as we have seen before in the market evolution section, the sample 
used to conduct the empirical analysis is mainly composed by AAA rating 
tranches. Therefore, in this smaller sample (used to compute credit spread) we 
have 64,984 rated tranches, being 96% of those tranches within investment grade 
class and 52% have triple A rating. Thus, the next chart presents the credit spread 
across the different rating classes within investment grade rating class. 
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Analysing the graph is evident the gradually increase of the credit spread as 
the rating deteriorates. As expected, according to the previous literature, higher 
the credit risk, leads to an increase in the credit spread. 
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The following tables provide descriptive statistics for the core explanatory 
variables of our models as well as for our dependent variable, the credit spread. 
Bivariate comparisons for all the variables analysed were conducted, using the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for continuous variables and the Fisher’s exact test for 
discrete variables 
Notes: This table presents the mean and the median for our core variables. Also, the tests for 
similar distributions in bond characteristics across samples are the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test for 
continuous variables and the Fisher's exact test for discrete variables. * indicates significant 
difference at 10% between the U.S. and W.E. samples; ** indicates significant difference at 5% 
between the U.S. and W.E. samples; and *** indicates significant difference at 1% between the 
U.S. and W.E. samples. 
 
Table 3.3.1 shows that the average credit spreads for all types of securities are 
economically and statistically (at 5% significance level) lower for issuances made 
in W.E. (15.49 bps in W.E. versus 19.55 bps in the U.S.). As a matter of fact, this is 
in line with the second hypothesis in which is intended to corroborate the fact 
that the credit spreads are higher in the U.S. rather than in W.E. Additionally, 
these credit spreads difference highlights what was presented in the Credit 
Variable of interest
Continuous variables: t test Mean Median Mean Median
Credit spread (bps) 19.55 35.15 15.49 0.52 **
Credit rating [1-22 weak] 3.52 1.00 4.60 3.00 ***
Maturity (years) 24.39 30.00 27.65 30.00 ***
Number of banks 2.20 1.00 2.67 2.00 ***
Transaction size ($ million) 823.18 679.70 1,870.34 851.34 ***
Tranche to transaction (% ) 29.70 8.00 24.55 8.01 ***
Tranche size ($ million) 202.04 51.00 270.93 62.75 ***
Number of tranches 8.99 8.00 6.33 6.00 ***
Country risk [1-22 weak] 1.00 1.00 1.59 1.00 ***
Dummy variables: Fisher's exact test (p-values) %  of total Number (D=1) %  of total Number (D=1)
Fixed rate issue 35.41 19,520 6.37 715 ***
Currency risk 0.94 518 21.23 2,383 ***
Callable 65.97 36,367 54.79 6,151 ***
U.K. borrowers - - 41.09 4,613 ***
U.S.
(N=55,127 )
W.E.
(N=11,227 )
Table 3.3 1.: Descriptive Statistics for tranches in the U.S. and W.E. 
 
 65 
Spread Analysis section. We can conclude that while the credit spread is lower 
on average for issuances made in W.E. the credit rating is statistically worse for 
issuances made in this region (4.6 in W.E. versus 3.52 in the U.S.). Though, 
investors perceive the issuances in the U.S. less risky if we look at the rating, but 
penalize the issuances made in the U.S. in terms of pricing. 
An average AS bond issuance matures in 27.65 years in W.E. and in 24.39 years 
in the U.S. According to the literature findings, the maturity of the securities 
issued frequently matches the maturity of the assets used as collateral, which 
normally have long maturities.(Vink and Thibeault, 2008) 
If we look now at the average number of banks involved in the operation, the 
average values for the U.S. are very similar for the ones in W.E., 2.2 and 2.67, 
respectively. As previously mentioned, the market sees as safer an issuance with 
more banks participating on it. Although, taking into account that our sample is 
mainly composed by investment grade tranches and the majority of them being 
AAA rating we can conclude that the market does not need to see a high number 
of banks involved in the operation, in order to increase the level of certification 
of the transaction. 
An average transaction in the US involves a $823.18 million issuance, lower 
than the $1,870.34 million, the average value for a transaction in W.E. 
Related with transaction size are tranche to transaction and tranche size. The 
first one is on average, higher in the U.S. (29.70%) than in W.E. (24.55%). The 
average tranche size is $ 270.93 million in W.E. and $ 202.04 million in the U.S. 
Additionally, the number of tranches is, on average, 8.99 in the U.S. and 6.33 in 
W.E. Putting together these three analysis it is possible to conclude that tranching 
reduces the pricing of the operation and banks benefit from tranching in a large 
degree. 
To end the continuous variables analysis, we also included the country risk. In 
fact, this value yields always 1 for the U.S. since it was repeatedly the same value 
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across years for this country. In W.E., the average country risk is 1.59 in our 
sample. 
Analysing the discrete variables, we can start by verify that in the U.S. 35.41% 
of the issued tranches are fixed rate, whereas in W.E. only 6.37% have a fixed 
coupon. Clearly the biggest portion of issuances were floating rate ones, which 
leaves investors with interest rate risk exposure. 
Currency risk shows that just a very inexpressive part of AS bonds issuances 
in the U.S. were affected by currency risk (issuances in another currency besides 
USD), 0.94%. Nonetheless, in W.E.  we can see that 21.23% of the issuances were 
made in another currency than Euro in the Eurozone countries or GBP in the U.K. 
The callability of an AS bond was also taken into consideration, and in fact, 
our results show that in the U.S. 65.97% of the bonds had the possibility to be 
called back, while in W.E. 54.79% had that option embedded. In reality, this 
option allows the issuer to call back the bonds in the case of a decreasing in the 
interest rates, in which normally the issuer redeems the initial bonds and issues 
new ones with lower interest rates, beneficiating from a reduction in the cost of 
funding. As it is understandable by the numbers, not just in the U.S. but also in 
W.E., the majority of the issuances had the callability option available. 
Finally, the last dummy variable under analysis is U.K. Borrowers that catches 
the percentage of issuances made in the U.K., within W.E. region. U.K. issuances 
represents 41.09% of the total amount of deals made in W.E. 
Table 3.3.2 shows differences between our core variables in relation to security 
type (MBS, ABS, or CDOs) and region (U.S. or W.E.). 
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Note: This table presents the mean and the median for our core variables. Also, the tests for 
similar distributions in bond characteristics across samples are the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test for 
continuous variables and the Fisher's exact test for discrete variables.  * indicates significant 
difference at 10% between the U.S. and W.E. samples; ** indicates significant difference at 5% 
between the U.S. and W.E. samples; and *** indicates significant difference at 1% between the 
U.S. and W.E. samples. 
 
The dependent variable credit spread shows a mean of 13.40bps for MBS, 
2.90bps for ABS and 91.58bps for CDOs in the U.S. Indeed, CDOs are the security 
type with a higher pricing, being in fact, the riskiest security type. In W.E., we 
can also see that the average value for credit spread on CDOs is 68.35bps, by far 
the biggest if we compare to the average credit spread of -0.29bps for MBS, and 
10.09bps for ABS. Hence, in W.E. MBS turns out to be the less costly security 
rather than ABS in the U.S. and in general, as we have concluded in the previous 
table the credit spread in W.E. is lower than in the U.S. 
Credit rating is higher for CDOs, in both the U.S. (5.15) and W.E. (5.16). For 
MBS, we have an average value of 1.60 in the U.S. and a significantly higher one 
for that kind of security in W.E., 4.50, on average. Moreover, ABS average credit 
Table 3.3.2.: Descriptive Statistics for ABS, MBS, and CDOs in the U.S. and W.E. 
Variable of interest
Continuous variables: t test Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Credit spread (bps) 13.40 37.95 2.90 22.74 91.58 84.91 -0.29 -6.90 *** 10.09 -2.10 ** 68.35 26.16 ***
Credit rating [1-22 weak] 1.60 1.00 3.87 2.00 5.15 4.00 4.50 3.00 *** 4.38 3.00 *** 5.16 3.00
Maturity (years) 25.87 30.00 24.61 30.00 21.31 14.00 34.60 36.00 *** 16.98 12.00 *** 19.37 14.00 ***
Number of banks 1.84 1.00 2.61 2.00 1.21 1.00 3.12 2.00 *** 2.44 2.00 *** 1.63 1.00 ***
Transaction size ($ million) 725.93 599.68 929.51 798.97 572.75 461.53 2,629.49 1,226.65 *** 987.95 726.61 *** 640.21 455.39 ***
Tranche to transaction (% ) 73.39 100.00 15.36 4.87 16.57 6.17 20.44 6.37 *** 38.92 19.11 *** 20.23 7.36 ***
Tranche size ($ million) 492.85 316.72 114.09 34.30 86.45 30.00 313.12 73.18 *** 299.02 90.26 *** 114.02 33.12 ***
Number of tranches 4.57 1.00 11.23 12.00 7.35 7.00 7.23 6.00 *** 3.87 3.00 *** 6.53 7.00 ***
Country risk [1-22 weak] 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.39 1.00 *** 2.00 1.00 *** 1.71 1.00 ***
Dummy variables: Fisher's exact test (p-values) %  of total Number (D=1) %  of total Number (D=1) %  of total Number (D=1) %  of total Number (D=1) %  of total Number 
(D=1)
%  of total
Number 
(D=1)
Fixed rate issue 73.80 9,919 27.09 8,920 7.79 682 2.46 160 *** 13.14 332 *** 10.14 223 ***
Currency risk 0.29 39 0.23 76 4.62 405 20.89 1,358 *** 8.95 226 *** 36.36 800 ***
Callable 53.43 7,181 83.71 27,563 18.49 1,620 58.71 3,817 *** 50.99 1,288 *** 47.55 1,046 ***
U.K. borrowers - - - - - - 51.33 3,337 *** 17.62 445 *** 37.77 831 ***
U.S.
(N=13,440)
ABS
(N=32,927)
CDO
(N= 8,760)
MBS 
(N=6,501)
ABS CDO
(N=2,200)
W.E.
MBS
(N=2,526)
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rating is also lower in the U.S., 3.87, rather than in W.E., 4.38. As a matter of fact, 
by analysing the first two variables we can verify that even in the U.S. the credit 
spread being higher for MBS and CDOs, the credit rating is in fact lower for this 
kind of securities. Thus, it is evident that when analysing the rating for these 
securities the rating agencies consider W.E. riskier for AS bonds issuances. 
Looking at maturity of the AS bonds, we can verify that in the U.S. the 
maturity for MBS is on average lower than in W.E., 25.87 years, and 34.60 years, 
respectively. However, for ABS and CDOs the maturity in W.E. is lower than the 
one in the U.S. For instance, ABS have an average maturity of 24.61 years in the 
U.S. and 16.98 years in W.E., while CDOs maturity is, on average, 21.31 years in 
the U.S. and 19.37 years in W.E. 
Regarding number of banks our results show that for MBS and CDOs the 
average number is higher in W.E., rather than in the U.S, being the opposite 
verified for ABS. Essentially, the average number of banks involved in an MBS 
transaction in the U.S. is 1.84, different from the 3.12 in W.E. In CDOs this number 
turns out to be 1.21 in the U.S. and 1.63 in W.E. Finally, for MBS we have an 
average of 2.61 number of banks running the operation in the U.S., contrasting 
with the 2.44 in W.E. 
Paying attention to the transaction size we find out that in W.E. the average 
transaction size in million dollars is higher for all types of securities, if we 
compare with the U.S. market. In the U.S. an average transaction size for MBS, 
involves $725 million, whereas in W.E. this value increases for $2,629 million. For 
ABS, the average value is $930 million in the U.S., smaller than $988 million in 
W.E. Finally, for CDOs, an average transaction reaches the value of $573 million 
in the U.S., jumping to $640 million in W.E. 
Regarding tranche to transaction, MBS is the security type with the highest 
value for both regions, yielding an average of 73.39% in the U.S. and 20.44% in 
W.E. With lower values for ABS, averaging 15.36% in the U.S. and 38.92% in W.E., 
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and for CDOs, 16.57% in the U.S. and 20.23% in W.E., we can say that the 
distribution of the total transaction amount per tranche is more split in these past 
two security types. 
A variable that is related to tranche to transaction is the tranche size, that in 
fact, reveals the same pattern as the previous described variable. For instance, 
MBS continues to be the security type that leads in the amount per tranche. An 
average tranche has an amount of $493 million and $313 million in the U.S. and 
W.E., respectively. For ABS and CDOs we can verify that they have a higher 
tranche size value in W.E. rather than in the U.S.: ABS with an average tranche 
size of $299 million in W.E., higher than $114 million in the U.S; and CDOs with 
$114 million in W.E., also above $86 million in the U.S. 
Considering the variable number of tranches, it is possible to see that in the 
U.S., ABS lead with an average of 11.23 tranches per transaction, whereas in W.E., 
MBS are the security type that assumes the highest value, with on average 7.23 
tranches per transaction. With respect to MBS and CDOs in the U.S. the values 
are on average, 4.57 and 7.35, respectively. Differently, in W.E. the average 
number of tranches is 3.87 for ABS and 6.53 for CDOs. 
To end the analysis for the continuous variables, the country risk in W.E. is on 
average 2 for ABS, being the security type with more exposure to this factor. 
Subsequently, CDOs come on the second position, with an average country risk 
of 1.71, followed by MBS with a value of 1.39. 
Starting our analysis for the dummy variables, we have a clear evidence that 
in the U.S. for MBS and ABS the use of fixed rate issuances is more common than 
in W.E, being the opposite true for CDOs. Looking at the numbers, it is possible 
to perceive that 73.80% of the issuances in the U.S. for MBS are fixed rate (the vast 
majority), different from 2.46% in W.E., where the clear preference of the issuers 
is floating rate. Regarding ABS, in the U.S. we have 27.09% of the issuances being 
fixed rate and 13.14% in W.E. With no doubt the preference here is to issue 
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floating rate notes in both regions. We can verify the same preference for CDOs, 
in which the fixed rate issuances get the value of 7.79% in the U.S. and 10.14% in 
W.E.  
The currency risk, if we just take into consideration the U.S. market is almost 
null, 0.29% of issuances made in a different currency than US dollars for MBS, 
0.23% for ABS, and 4.62% for CDOs. If we look to W.E. region, the currency risk 
impact is higher for all types of securities. For MBS, we get a value of 20.89% 
8.95% for ABS and 36.36% for CDOs. 
Regarding callability, both in the U.S. and W.E., for MBS and ABS the majority 
of the issuances were callable. However, for CDOs, we can say the opposite. For 
instance, 53.43% of MBS issuances in the U.S. were callable, and 58.72% in W.E. 
For ABS we see the values of 83.71% and 50.99%, for the U.S. and W.E., 
respectively. Finally, for CDOs the value is below fifty percent, in fact 18.495 in 
the U.S. and 47.55% in W.E. Clearly the last-mentioned security type is different 
from the two others. We have verified before that the market considers CDOs has 
the riskiest security type among the three analysed ones and also the issuers do 
not consider a benefit to call back CDOs in a scenario of interest rate decreased 
to issue again with lower interest rates. 
The last variable U.K. Borrowers allows us to perceive that in our sample MBS 
issuances in the U.K. represent 51.33% of the issuances made in W.E. region. ABS 
issued in the U.K., represent 17.62% of this type of security issuances in W.E. 
Finally, CDOs issuances in the U.K. stand for 37.77%. 
Table 3.3.3 show how core variables change between pre-crisis and crisis 
(2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis) periods per 
region of issuance (U.S. versus W.E.) and security type (ABS, MBS or CDO). 
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Note: This table presents the mean and the median for our core variables. Also, the tests for similar distributions in bond characteristics across samples are 
the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test for continuous variables and the Fisher's exact test for discrete variables.  * indicates significant difference at 10% between the 
U.S. and W.E. samples; ** indicates significant difference at 5% between the U.S. and W.E. samples; and *** indicates significant difference at 1% between the 
U.S. and W.E. samples.
Dummy Variables Number %  of total Number 
(D=1)
Fisher's 
Exact test
Number %  of total
Number 
(D=1)
Fisher's 
Exact test
Number %  of total
Number 
(D=1)
Fisher's 
Exact test
Number %  of total
Number 
(D=1)
Fisher's 
Exact test
Number %  of total
Number 
(D=1)
Fisher's 
Exact test
Number %  of total
Number 
(D=1)
Fisher's 
Exact test
Fixed rate issue
pre-crisis 7,263.00 66.24 4,811 *** 7,263.00 21.53 6,334 *** 7,263.00 8.69 604 *** 7,263.00 1.60 81 *** 7,263.00 8.69 107 *** 7,263.00 9.77 164
crisis 6,177.00 82.69 5,108 6,177.00 73.66 2,584 6,177.00 4.30 78 6,177.00 5.43 79 6,177.00 17.39 225 6,177.00 11.30 59
Currency risk
pre-crisis 7,263.00 0.32 23 7,263.00 0.19 56 *** 7,263.00 5.00 347 *** 7,263.00 24.13 1,218 *** 7,263.00 10.63 131 *** 7,263.00 31.47 528 ***
crisis 6,177.00 0.26 16 6,177.00 0.57 20 6,177.00 3.15 57 6,177.00 9.62 140 6,177.00 7.34 95 6,177.00 52.11 272
Callable
pre-crisis 7,263.00 76.29 5,541 *** 7,263.00 89.86 26,436 *** 7,263.00 20.85 1,449 *** 7,263.00 56.41 2,847 *** 7,263.00 53.65 661 ** 7,263.00 43.62 732 ***
crisis 6,177.00 26.55 1,640 6,177.00 32.18 1,129 6,177.00 9.44 171 6,177.00 66.71 970 6,177.00 48.45 627 6,177.00 60.15 314
UK Borrowers
pre-crisis 7,263.00 - - - 7,263.00 - - - 7,263.00 - - - 7,263.00 53.77 2,714 *** 7,263.00 18.59 229 7,263.00 33.02 554 ***
crisis 6,177.00 - - 6,177.00 - - 6,177.00 - - 6,177.00 42.85 623 6,177.00 16.69 216 6,177.00 53.07 277
U.S. W.E.
MBS ABS CDO MBS ABS CDO
Continuous variables: t test Number Mean Median T Test Number Mean Median T Test Number Mean Median T Test Number Mean Median T Test Number Mean Median T Test Number Mean Median T Test
Credit spread (bps)
pre-crisis 7,263.00 27.96 55.60 *** 29,419.00 -1.57 22.27 *** 6,948.00 80.93 79.27 *** 5,047.00 12.26 8.60 *** 1,232.00 19.14 2.45 *** 1,678.00 33.49 -0.85 ***
crisis 6,177.00 -3.71 7.60 3,508.00 40.35 24.39 1,812.00 132.44 115.99 1,454.00 -43.85 -72.43 1,294.00 1.47 -6.20 522.00 180.41 154.80
Credit rating [1-22 weak]
pre-crisis 7,263.00 1.49 1.00 *** 29,419.00 3.96 3.00 *** 6,948.00 4.88 3.00 *** 5,047.00 4.66 3.00 *** 1,232.00 5.02 5.00 *** 1,678.00 4.90 3.00 ***
crisis 6,177.00 1.74 1.00 3,508.00 3.06 1.00 1,812.00 6.25 6.00 1,454.00 3.86 1.00 1,294.00 3.69 1.00 522.00 6.01 6.00
Maturity (years)
pre-crisis 7,263.00 26.93 30.00 *** 29,419.00 26.43 30.00 *** 6,948.00 23.87 15.00 *** 5,047.00 32.68 34.00 *** 1,232.00 18.91 13.00 *** 1,678.00 20.77 16.00 ***
crisis 6,177.00 24.62 29.00 3,508.00 9.29 5.00 1,812.00 11.50 12.00 1,454.00 41.26 40.00 1,294.00 15.14 10.00 522.00 14.87 13.00
Number of banks
pre-crisis 7,263.00 1.50 1.00 *** 29,419.00 2.33 2.00 *** 6,948.00 1.24 1.00 *** 5,047.00 3.38 3.00 *** 1,232.00 2.71 2.00 *** 1,678.00 1.80 1.00 ***
crisis 6,177.00 2.24 2.00 3,508.00 5.03 5.00 1,812.00 1.10 1.00 1,454.00 2.19 2.00 1,294.00 2.18 1.00 522.00 1.07 1.00
Transaction size
pre-crisis 7,263.00 753.09 582.58 *** 29,419.00 945.08 800.00 *** 6,948.00 592.03 461.09 *** 5,047.00 2,477.96 1,194.93 *** 1,232.00 1,004.85 660.20 1,678.00 650.59 452.33
crisis 6,177.00 693.99 610.03 3,508.00 798.97 764.82 1,812.00 498.84 463.80 1,454.00 3,155.48 1,358.90 1,294.00 971.86 759.99 522.00 606.87 459.60
Tranche to transaction (% )
pre-crisis 7,263.00 77.45 100.00 *** 29,419.00 13.22 4.02 *** 6,948.00 16.84 6.07 ** 5,047.00 19.08 5.69 *** 1,232.00 31.64 10.42 *** 1,678.00 21.27 7.87 ***
crisis 6,177.00 68.62 100.00 3,508.00 33.29 20.71 1,812.00 15.52 6.39 1,454.00 25.15 9.91 1,294.00 45.86 30.00 522.00 16.87 6.36
Tranche size ($ million)
pre-crisis 7,263.00 556.89 395.27 *** 29,419.00 100.62 29.68 *** 6,948.00 88.95 30.00 *** 5,047.00 274.95 62.68 *** 1,232.00 258.53 59.55 *** 1,678.00 111.36 34.01
crisis 6,177.00 417.55 255.99 3,508.00 227.09 142.36 1,812.00 76.84 31.04 1,454.00 445.62 199.48 1,294.00 337.58 143.09 522.00 122.56 30.57
Number of tranches
pre-crisis 7,263.00 5.26 1.00 *** 29,419.00 12.02 13.00 *** 6,948.00 7.33 7.00 ** 5,047.00 7.71 6.00 *** 1,232.00 4.34 4.00 *** 1,678.00 6.22 6.00 ***
crisis 6,177.00 3.76 1.00 3,508.00 4.68 5.00 1,812.00 7.43 7.00 1,454.00 5.55 5.00 1,294.00 3.43 3.00 522.00 7.52 8.00
Country risk [1-22 weak]
pre-crisis 7,263.00 1.00 1.00 - 29,419.00 1.00 1.00 - 6,948.00 1.00 1.00 - 5,047.00 1.26 1.00 *** 1,232.00 1.55 1.00 *** 1,678.00 1.18 1.00 ***
crisis 6,177.00 1.00 1.00 3,508.00 1.00 1.00 1,812.00 1.00 1.00 1,454.00 1.87 1.00 1,294.00 2.43 1.00 522.00 3.38 2.00
CDO
W.E.U.S.
MBS ABS CDO MBS ABS
Table 3.3.3.: Descriptive Statistics for ABS, MBS, and CDOs in the U.S. and W.E. before and crisis 
 72 
The statistics for credit spread yield that for MBS issuances in the U.S. the 
spread was lower before the crisis period, on average 27.96 bps than during the 
crisis, -3.71 bps. However, this variable was on average higher during the crisis 
period for ABS and CDOs. ABS had an average credit spread of -1.57 bps before 
the crisis and 40.35 bps during, whereas CDOs had 80.93 bps and 132.44 bps, 
respectively. In the W.E. region we can state that for MBS, the average credit 
spread reduced from 12.26 bps, before the crisis period, to -43.85 bps during the 
crisis period. This also happened with ABS, in which the average credit spread 
decreased from 19.14 bps before the crisis period to 1.47 bps during the crisis 
period. On the contrary the average credit spread for CDOs increased in W.E. 
from 33.49 bps during the crisis period to 180.41 bps during the crisis period. 
Once more, it is possible to corroborate the analysis done in credit spread analysis 
section, in which is evident that CDOs are the riskiest securities, due to higher 
credit spreads than ABS and MBS. Moreover, for ABS and MBS the average credit 
spreads during the crisis period tend to be higher in the U.S. rather than in W.E., 
where the average credit spread for CDOs is actually higher. 
Looking now at credit rating, we can see that in the U.S. for MBS and CDOs, 
the average credit rating increased from 1.49 to 1.74 and 4.88 to 6.25, respectively. 
It is understandable since the financial crisis tarnished the image of these 
products. On the opposite for ABS issued in the U.S. the average credit rating, 
actually decreased from 3.96 before the crisis to 3.06 during the crisis. In W.E. we 
can assist to a reduction of the average credit spread comparing the before crisis 
and during crisis periods. On MBS from 4.66 to 3.86 and ABS from 5.02 to 3.69. 
As in the U.S. CDOs suffered an increase in credit rating during the crisis period 
from 4.90 to 6.01. Again, CDOs represent the security type with the highest 
downgrade in credit rating not just in the U.S. but also in W.E. and it is possible 
to perceive that in the period before crisis as well as in the period during the crisis 
 73 
the average credit rating is always lower in the U.S. rather than in W.E., no matter 
the type of security we are analysing. 
In relation to maturity, on average, we can assist at a reduction of the years to 
maturity of an AS bond issuance. In the U.S. for all security types the time to 
maturity reduces comparing the before crisis period to the during crisis period. 
For instance, MBS reduce from 26.93 to 24.62 years, ABS from 26.43 to 9.29 years 
and CDOs from 23.87 to 11.50. In the W.E. region for ABS and CDOs the same 
thing happens, having ABS a reduction from 18.91 to 15.14 years and CDOs from 
20.77 to 14.87 years. By contrast the maturity of MBS in W.E. increased from 32.68 
years before the crisis period to 41.26 years during the crisis period. As 
previously stated by the literature, the maturity of an AS bond is normally the 
same as the securities used as collateral. 
Turning our attention to the variable number of banks, that is seen as better if 
the operation is certificated by a considerable number of banks we can verify that 
in the U.S. for MBS and CDOs the average number of banks involved in the 
operation increased from the period before the crisis to the period during the 
crisis, from 1.50 to 2.24 for MBS and 2.33 to 5.03 in ABS. Nonetheless, for CDOs 
in the U.S. and for all security types in W.E. we can assist to a reduction on the 
average number of banks running the operation comparing the pre-crisis and 
post crisis periods. For CDOs in the U.S. the number decreased from 1.24 to 1.10, 
for MBS in W.E., from 3.38 to 2.19, ABS in W.E., from 2.71 to 2.18, and CDOs in 
W.E. from 1.80 to 1.07. It is also possible to conclude that before the crisis the 
average number of banks running the operation in W.E. was higher than the one 
in the U.S. for all types of securities. However, after the crisis the average number 
of banks involved in the operation was higher in the U.S. This can represent a 
factor of U.S. becoming a riskier market after the crisis and to increase the degree 
of certification of AS bonds issued in this country more banks were involved in 
the transactions. 
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Transaction size was also a variable to take into consideration. Here, we can 
observe a decrease of the amounts per transaction on average, if we compare the 
before crisis to the post crisis periods in both markets (U.S. and W.E.) for all types 
of securities, with the exception of MBS issued in W.E., in which the number 
increased from 2,477.96 million dollars average transaction to 3,155.48 million 
dollars. Furthermore, the analysis allows us to say that the transaction size 
amounts are always higher in W.E. rather than in the U.S. no matter the time 
period. Also, in the U.S., ABS are the security with the highest transaction size 
value, whereas in W.E., MBS turns out to be the one with the highest value, on 
average. 
Another important variable associated with the transaction size is the tranche 
to transaction. Firstly, we can say that in the North American country MBS are 
the security type with more tranche to transaction size on average. Although, this 
value reduced from 77.45% to 68.62% if we compare the pre-crisis and post-crisis 
periods. Secondly for CDOs issued in the U.S. and W.E., we also noticed a 
reduction from 16.84% to 15.52% and 21.27% to 16.87%, respectively. Thirdly, for 
ABS issued in the U.S. and in W.E., as well as for MBS issued in W.E. we had an 
increase in the average tranche to transaction size, if we compare the periods 
before crisis and crisis. For ABS in the U.S., the value jumped from 13.22% to 
33.29%. Regarding MBS in W.E. it increased from 19.08% to 25.15% and finally 
for ABS in W.E. the value climbed from 31.64% to 45.86%. Looking at these values 
we can state that in W.E. ABS are the security type with the highest tranche to 
transaction value. 
The tranche size, both in the U.S. and W.E. is higher for MBS from 2000 to 2016. 
However, it is important to refer that in W.E. the tranche size values increased 
for all types of securities if we compare the pre-crisis and post crisis periods. This 
pattern is also the same for ABS issuances in the U.S., whereas for MBS and CDOs 
issuances in the previous mentioned country the value actually increased. 
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The last analysed variable related to the issuance process was the number of 
tranches, in which the pattern was very similar for the U.S. and W.E. Indeed, the 
number of tranches for MBS and ABS decreased from the pre-crisis period to the 
crisis period in W.E. and the U.S. Even though, for CDOs issued in the U.S. and 
W.E. this value increased. Before the crisis in the U.S., ABS were the security type 
with the highest value 12.02, on average, but after the crisis CDOs turned out to 
be the security type with the highest number of tranches, 7.43. In W.E., before the 
crisis MBS had the highest number of tranches 7.71, but as it happened in the U.S. 
CDOs became the security type high the highest value 7.52. 
Finally, country risk was the last continuous variable analysed and of course, 
it does not make sense to comment the values of this variable for the U.S., since 
the risk of this country was always one during the entire period of analysis of 
this research. Although, for W.E., we can notice a boost in this value if we 
compare the pre-crisis and crisis periods for all types of securities. In fact, in the 
pre-crisis period ABS were the security type with more country risk associated, 
1.55, raising to 2.43 during the crisis. However, crisis was responsible for the 
jump in country risk values for CDOs that went from 1.18 to 3.38. MBS also 
suffered a hike from 1.26 to 1.87, pre-crisis to crisis. 
Turning now our attention to the discrete variables, it is important to 
understand the differences in the type of issuances made (fixed rate and floating 
rate). Thus, we can verify that just for MBS issued in the U.S. the number of fixed 
rate issuances (66.24%) is higher than the one of floating rate issuances, if we take 
into consideration the pre-crisis period. However, during the crisis period not 
just fixed rate MBS issued in the U.S. (82.69%) had more issuances than floating 
rates ones, but also fixed rate ABS issued in the U.S. (73.66%). In general, in W.E. 
the percentage of fixed rate issuances was very low for both periods, which also 
happened in the U.S. for CDOs. 
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Currency risk was another analysed dummy variable. In the U.S. this impact 
is also insignificant, because the vast majority of issuances were made in USD. 
Although, in W.E., since it is divided in two main currencies (Euro and GBP), and 
being the USD the most used currency in this kind of deals we have different 
values for this variable. Therefore, before the crisis the percentage of issuances 
made in W.E. with a different currency from the issuer country were 24.13% for 
MBS, 10.63% for ABS and 31.47% for CDOs. During the crisis this value decreased 
for MBS and ABS, 9.62% and 7.34%, respectively, though it increased for CDOs, 
in which the percentage turned out to be 52.11%, which means that in W.E. 
during the crisis period, for CDOs the majority of the issuances were exposed to 
currency risk. 
The third dummy variable analysed was if the issuance was callable or not. 
Starting by the U.S. market it is possible to see that for MBS and ABS before the 
crisis 76.29% and 89.86% of the issuances were callable, respectively. Although 
the value decreased to 26.55% and 32.18% during the crisis period. If we look at 
CDOs, issued in the U.S., 20.85% were callable before the crisis and 9.44% could 
be called back during the crisis. Indeed, the callability option embedded in all 
kind of securities in the U.S. was not so common to use during the crisis period. 
In W.E., we do not have so many discrepancies if we compare pre-crisis with 
crisis periods, For MBS the value increase from 56.41% before the crisis to 66.71% 
after the crisis. For ABS it decreased from 53.65% to 48.45% and finally for CDOs 
it jumped from 43.62% to 60.15%. As a matter of fact, in W.E. during the crisis it 
became more common to issue callable MBS and CDOs than in the U.S. for the 
same period. 
Finally, the last dummy variable analysed was UK Borrowers, that, in fact just 
makes sense to interpret the outcome for issuances made in the W.E., since it 
analyses the deals made in U.K. Regarding our sample, we can see that in the 
pre-crisis period 53.77% of MBS, 18.59% of ABS and 33.02% of CDOs deals were 
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made in the U.K., whereas during the crisis period, 42.85% of MBS, 16.69% of 
ABS, and 53.07% of CDOs deals were issued in the U.K. 
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4 Multivariate Analysis 
4.1 Regression Analysis 
In this section we used the sample with available information on credit spread, 
to perform some OLS regression analyses, with the goal to test our three 
hypotheses. Since this sample contains tranches some belonging to the same deal, 
it is expected that the standard errors between tranches are correlated. To avoid 
this collinearity, we decided to cluster standard errors by deal and by year. Thus, 
our initial core model is the following: 
 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖=   α + 𝛽1 W.E. bef crisis + 𝛽2 W.E. crisis + 𝛽3Rated  
+ 𝛽4 Rated Rating + 𝛽5 Transaction Size + 𝛽6 Tranche to Transaction  
+ 𝛽7 Callable + 𝛽8 ABS + 𝛽9 MBS + 𝛽10 Number of banks + 𝛽11 Currency Risk 
+ 𝛽12 Maturity + 𝛽13 Subordinated Debt + 𝛽14 Fixed Rate + 𝛽15 Country Risk 
+ 𝛽16 Risk free + 𝛽17 Volatility + 𝛽18 Government Yield + 𝛽19 GDP per capita 
+ 𝛽20 Creditor Rights L + 𝛽21 UK Borrowers 
 
With this core model we intend to test hypothesis one and two; i.e., to 
understand the differences between the pricing and pricing determinants in the 
U.S. vis-à-vis with W.E., including also the U.K. Borrower’s variable to catch the 
differences of AS bonds issuances in this region. In order to test the third 
hypothesis, our model was split in a way to get the credit spread of ABS, MBS, 
and CDOs analyzed separately, and was also divided into two periods, before 
crisis or pre-crisis period and crisis period, with this last period including the 
2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. 
Again, some regression analysis were performed in order to compare these two 
distinct periods in the sample. In addition, some robustness checks were also 
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performed, such as the adjusted spread test, in which floating to fixed rate swaps 
were used in order to compare the spreads of the two issuance types, by 
converting the floating rate notes’ spread in a fixed rate note’s spread. Also, 
Laporta creditor rights scale (La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, et al., 1998) was 
substituted by Spamman creditor rights scale, and finally we introduced issuer 
parent details such as: (1) the natural logarithm of total assets (Ln TA); (2) the 
ratio of net loans to Total Assets (Net Loans/TA); (3) the ratio Liquid Assets to 
Deposits and Short-Term Funding (Liquid A/Deposits); (4) the ratio Net Loans to 
Deposits and Short-Term Funding (Loans/Deposits); (5) the capital ratio 
(Equity/TA); and (6) the cost to income (Cost to Income). 
 
Regression Results 
In order to compare W.E. and the U.S, the variables W.E. before crisis and W.E. 
crisis were introduced. Moreover, to catch the differences in pricing factors 
between the U.K., within W.E. market the variable U.K. Borrowers was also 
added to the models. Thus, in table 4.1.1, is possible to understand the difference 
in pricing factors between a model without U.K. and other with U.K. 
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Table 4.1 1.: Regression analysis on the impact of the independent variables on the credit spread 
 
Dependent variable: [1] [2]
Credit Spread (bps)
ABS, MBS 
and CDO
ABS, MBS 
and CDO
Independent variables:
Intercept -190.23 *** -12.17
(-7.78) (-0.44)
W.E. before crisis 26.60 *** -45.98 ***
(4.30) (-6.23)
W.E. crisis 74.16 *** 20.88 ***
(10.72) (2.62)
Rated -74.55 *** -73.39 ***
(-10.39) (-10.10)
Rated Rating 21.10 *** 21.31 ***
(75.31) (76.32)
Transaction Size 0.00 0.00
(1.51) (1.04)
Tranche to transaction -0.03 0.03
(-1.14) (1.09)
Callable 4.60 ** 6.20 ***
(2.10) (2.91)
ABS -56.79 *** -57.91 ***
(-18.83) (-19.84)
MBS -49.00 *** -58.28 ***
(-12.79) (-15.79)
Number of banks -3.31 *** -3.98 ***
(-6.34) (-7.64)
Currency Risk -25.49 *** -64.88
(-4.13) (-10.40)
Maturity -1.55 *** -1.46 ***
(-18.35) (-17.33)
Subordinated Debt 22.27 *** 23.04 ***
(9.65) (9.98)
Fixed Rate 143.53 *** 146.93 ***
(54.65) (55.41)
Country Risk 8.54 *** 9.87 ***
(5.72) (6.34)
Risk Free Rate 51.20 *** 50.97 ***
(23.72) (23.58)
Volatility 2.50 *** 2.530 ***
(11.56) (11.53)
Government Yield -7.46 ** -14.63 ***
(-2.55) (-4.41)
GDP per capita 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
(11.25) (3.83)
Creditor Rights -4.64 *** -18.90 ***
(-3.33) (-12.31)
UK Borrowers - 130.61 ***
- (17.74)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of observations 66,262 66,262
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.59
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Note: Table 4.1.1 presents the results of OLS regression analysis of the determinants of Asset 
Securitization Bonds credit spread in the 2000-2016 period. Credit Spread is computed as the 
margin yielded (in bases points) by the security at issue above a corresponding currency treasury 
benchmark with a comparable maturity. W.E. before crisis is computed by giving 1 to all the 
observations of W.E. occurred before September 15th 2008. W.E. crisis is computed by giving 1 to 
all the observations of W.E. occurred before September 15th 2008. Rated takes the value 1 if the 
tranche is rated. Rated Rating gives the rating according to the S&P credit rating scale at the time 
of the bond issuance; the rating is converted as follows: AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until 
D=22. Transaction Size gives the value of the transaction at the time of issuance in USD. Tranche 
to transaction is the percentage that the tranche has in the transaction. Callable takes the value 
one if the tranche is callable. ABS take the value one if the tranche refers to an ABS issuance. MBS 
takes the value one if the tranche refers to an MBS issuance. Number of banks gives the number 
of banks involved in the deal. Currency Risk takes the value 1 if the deal was done in a currency 
different from the one used in the country of issuance. Maturity is the maturity of the tranche in 
years. Subordinated Debt takes the value one if the debt related to the tranche is the last one to 
be paid. Fixed Rate takes the value one if the coupon of the tranche is a fixed rate one. Country 
Risk follows a scale of the risk of the country according to the year. Risk Free Rate gives the rate 
of the US 3-month treasury bills according t the time of the issuance. Volatility refers to the values 
of the Volatility Index (VIX). Government Yield presents the 10-year government yield of the 
country in which the bond was issued. GDP per capita per country in which the tranche was 
issued. Creditor Rights follows the Laporta’s Creditor Rights Scale. UK Borrowers takes the value 
one if the tranche was issued in the UK. ***, ** and * indicates that the reported coefficients are 
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics 
reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by 
transaction. 
 
Table 4.1.1 shows that in model [1] the variable W.E. before crisis takes the 
value of 26.60 (significant at 1% level), whereas if we add the variable U.K. 
Borrowers, like it was done in model [2] we can see that this value drops to -45.98 
(significant at 1% level). This means that the U.K. is strongly responsible for the 
increase on the credit spread for AS bonds. In fact, the variable U.K. Borrowers in 
model [2] states that an issuance made in the U.K. has, on average, a credit spread 
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130.61 bps (significant at 1% level) higher if we compare to an issuance made in 
the remaining W.E. countries or in the U.S.  
In the same table is also possible to analyse the effects of the other pricing 
factors.  If we take a look to the variable W.E. crisis, in model [1] it is evident that 
the value is on average higher in W.E. than in the U.S., adding 74.16 bps 
(significant at 1% level) more to the credit spread of AS bonds issued in W.E in 
that period. If we control for the U.K. Borrowers’ variable, looking at model [2] we 
can perceive once more that the value decreases to 20.88 (significant at 1% level) 
in W.E. crisis. Though, the value is still positive, yielding that issuances in 
Continental Europe during crisis add, on average, more 20.88 bps than in the U.S. 
Our results are in line with the previous literature which found that credit 
rating is one of the most important determinant of credit spread. Therefore, as 
we can see, rated tranches have on average a credit spread lower than not rated 
ones. For instance, in model [1], on average, rated tranches have a lower credit 
spread than not rated ones, -74.55 (significant at 1% level) whereas the value is 
very similar, -73.39 (significant at 1% level) in model [2]. In addition, rating is also 
related to credit spread. Hence, the variable Rated Rating allows us to compare 
the differences in pricing among the rating classes of the rated tranches. As for 
rated variable, the significance and magnitude of the coefficient for the model 
with and without U.K. are very similar. Essentially, a unit downgrade from AAA 
to AA+ increases credit spread by 21.10 bps (significant at 1% level) in the first 
model and 21.31 bps (significant at 1% level) in the second one.  
The next two controllers used in these two regression models were the 
Transaction Size and Tranche to Transaction. Although, there is an insignificant 
relationship between transaction size and tranche to transaction variables on 
credit spread. 
In models [1] and [2] we decided to include the variables ABS and MBS in 
order to compare the pricing of the three security types (ABS, MBS, and CDOs). 
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ABS and MBS have a negative and significant impact on credit spread, which 
means that CDOs are the security type with the higher credit spread. Once more, 
it is expected since CDOs represent the riskiest type of security and the one with 
the most tarnished image. In fact, in model [1] ABS get the coefficient value of -
56.79 (significant at 1% level), similar to the one achieved in model [2], -57.91 
(significant at 1% level). For MBS the coefficient values are also similar, -49.00 
(significant at 1% level) in model [1] and -58.28 (significant at 1% level) in model 
[2]. 
Regarding Number of Banks, our results corroborate the idea that a higher 
number of banks increase the certification of the operation. A transaction with 
one additional bank lowers the credit spread, on average, in -3.31 bps (significant 
at 1% level) and -3.98 bps (significant at 1% level) in models [1] and [2], 
respectively.  
Currency Risk behaves differently in the two models. While in model [1] 
currency risk and credit spread have a significant negative relationship, yielding 
the value of -25.49 (significant at 1% level), the impact of currency risk in model 
[2] is insignificant. 
As we expected based on extant AS literature, the impact of Maturity on credit 
spread is negative, by -1.55 bps (significant at 1% level) in model [1] and -1.46 bps 
(significant at 1% level) in model [2]. 
Subordinated bonds have a 22.27 bps (significant at 1% level) and 23.04 bps 
(significant at 1% level) average increase on credit spread than senior ones in 
models [1] and [2], respectively. 
As seen in the variable analysis section, floating rate issuances have a lower 
credit spread since the issuers are exposed to the interest rate risk, while in fixed 
rate issuances they do not face this risk. Indeed, fixed rate ones are much more 
penalized in terms of credit spread than floating rate tranches. For the first model 
a fixed rate issuance increments the spread in more 143.53 bps (significant at 1% 
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level) than a floating rate one, whereas in the second model it increases the 
spread in more 146.93 bps (significant at 1% level) in comparison to a floating 
rate issuance. In fact, the issuers of fixed rate AS bonds have to pay an additional 
premium that is embedded in the credit spread in order to not be exposed to the 
interest rate risk during the life of a bond, which would be different if they issued 
floating rate notes.  
Country Risk also impacts positively and significantly the credit spread: an 
increase of rating scale in the country risk increases the credit spread by 8.54 bps 
(significant at 1% level) in the first model and 9.87 bps (significant at 1% level) in 
the second one. 
Both the level of Risk Free interest rates and market volatility have a significant 
positive impact on credit spreads. For instance, the coefficient of Risk Free Rate in 
model [1] is 51.20 (significant at 1% level), and 50.97 (significant at 1% level) in 
model [2]. For Volatility, it yields 2.50 (significant at 1% level) in mode [1] and 
2.53 (significant at 1 % level) in model [2]. 
The next pricing determinant of the credit spread is the Government Yield, for 
which, as expected, we find that an increase in the government yield slope (an 
increase in the differences between the 10 years yield curve and the 3-month yield 
curve) decreases the credit spread by 7.46 bps (significant at 5% level) and 14.63 
bps (significant at 1% level) in models [1] and [2], respectively.  
The last two variables, GDP per capita and Creditor Rights, represent two 
macroeconomic variables, significant and positively and negatively correlated 
with the credit spread, respectively. On the one hand, a GDP per capita increase 
is not noticeable in the boost of the credit spread of an AS bond, 0.004 bps 
(significant at 1% level) increase model [1] and 0.002 bps (significant at 1% level) 
in model [2]. On the other hand, an increase of one point in Laporta’s creditor 
rights scale represents a 4.64 bps (significant at 1% level) decrease in model [1] 
and 18.90bps (significant at 1% level) decrease in model [2]. 
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Two additional models were performed and presented in the appendix 
section. On the one hand, model [1b] 4 , composed by the observations of all 
security types with available credit spread in the U.K. and in the U.S. The main 
findings are: (1) the substantial difference between the credit spread in the two 
countries, higher in the U.K. before the crisis (88.77 bps) (significant at 1% level) 
and also in the crisis period (67.18 bps) (significant at 5% level; (2) the country 
risk higher in the UK, boosting the spread 66 bps (significant at 1% level) if we 
compare with the US. This is an evidence that the credit spread in the U.K. is the 
main responsible one to increase the credit spread for W.E. region. 
On the other hand, a model just including AS bonds’ issuances before the 
crisis, model [1c]5, was also performed and presented in the appendix. The main 
conclusion that we can take is that the value of the variable W.E. before crisis 
becomes even more positive (from 26.60 bps in model [1] to 41.71 bps in this 
model) (significant at 1% level), stating that the issuances in W.E. in comparison 
to the ones in the U.S. have a higher credit spread, mainly because of the 
issuances in the U.K. 
                                                 
4 Model [1b] presented in table 7.3, and model [6a] presented in table 7.4, regress the credit spread and the adjusted 
spread, respectively for issuances of AS bonds made in the U.K and in the U.S. Presented in the appendix section. 
5 Model [1c] presented in table 7.3, and model [6b] presented in table 7.4, regress the credit spread and the adjusted 
spread, respectively for issuances of AS bonds before crisis. Presented in the appendix section. 
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Table 4.1 2.: Regression analysis on the impact of the independent variables on the credit 
spread for each security type, ABS, MBS, and CDOs 
 
Dependent variable: [3] [4] [5]
Credit Spread (bps) ABS MBS CDO
Independent variables:
Intercept -174.50 *** -188.63 *** 33.57
(-2.74) (-3.98) (0.34)
W.E. before crisis -22.32 13.31 -126.41 ***
(-1.44) (1.28) (-8.58)
W.E. crisis 21.49 ** 18.84 -23.89
(2.11) (1.37) (-0.98)
Rated -61.95 *** -112.09 *** -22.93
(-7.45) (-8.31) (-1.47)
Rated Rating 18.40 *** 17.33 *** 29.90 ***
(56.37) (26.58) (47.49)
Transaction Size 0.00 0.00 -0.01
(-1.49) (0.62) (-1.39)
Tranche to transaction -0.23 *** 0.05 *** 0.03
(-7.03) (-2.86) (0.48)
Callable 0.60 ** 14.23 *** -26.75 ***
(0.18) (4.90) (-4.53)
Number of banks -2.80 *** -1.44 -13.25 ***
(-4.31) (-1.54) (-4.51)
Currency Risk -5.51 -116.37 *** -36.07 ***
(-0.43) (-15.07) (-2.78)
Maturity -1.42 *** -1.38 *** -0.54 ***
(-10.25) (-8.53) (-3.61)
Subordinated Debt 4.47 20.94 *** 5.80
(1.53) (3.92) (1.02)
Fixed Rate 153.57 *** 147.64 *** 116.68 ***
(37.59) (36.23) (12.49)
Country Risk 13.25 *** 16.03 *** 7.11 **
(4.45) (5.68) (2.00)
Risk Free Rate 66.20 *** 21.77 *** 45.83 ***
(23.39) (6.71) (6.80)
Volatility 2.428 *** 2.12 *** 3.18 ***
(7.52) (6.50) (5.69)
Government Yield -27.72 *** -8.26 * -23.13 ***
(-5.14) (-1.69) (-3.56)
GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 **
(1.56) (7.81) (-2.47)
Creditor Rights -19.95 *** 3.86 ** -40.63 ***
(-6.96) (2.12) (-9.41)
UK Borrowers 92.83 *** 86.90 *** 176.30 ***
(6.56) (9.24) (8.70)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 35,445 19,908 10,909
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.48 0.64
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Note: Table 4.1.2 presents the results of OLS regression analysis of the determinants of Asset 
Securitization Bonds from 2000 to 2016, split by security type. Credit Spread is computed as the 
margin yielded (in bases points) by the security at issue above a corresponding currency treasury 
benchmark with a comparable maturity. W.E. before crisis is computed by giving 1 to all the 
observations of W.E. occurred before September 15th 2008. W.E. crisis is computed by giving 1 to 
all the observations of W.E. occurred before September 15th 2008. Rated takes the value 1 if the 
tranche is rated. Rated Rating gives the rating according to the S&P credit rating scale at the time 
of the bond issuance; the rating is converted as follows: AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until 
D=22. Transaction Size gives the value of the transaction at the time of issuance in USD. Tranche 
to transaction is the percentage that the tranche has in the transaction. Callable takes the value 
one if the tranche is callable. Number of banks gives the number of banks involved in the deal. 
Currency Risk takes the value 1 if the deal was done in a currency different from the one used in 
the country of issuance. Maturity is the maturity of the tranche in years. Subordinated Debt takes 
the value one if the debt related to the tranche is the last one to be paid. Fixed Rate takes the value 
one if the coupon of the tranche is a fixed rate one. Country Risk follows a scale of the risk of the 
country according to the year. Risk Free Rate gives the rate of the US 3-month treasury bills 
according t the time of the issuance. Volatility refers to the values of the Volatility Index (VIX). 
Government Yield presents the 10-year government yield of the country in which the bond was 
issued. GDP per capita per country in which the tranche was issued. Creditor Rights follows the 
Laporta’s Creditor Rights Scale. UK Borrowers takes the value one if the tranche was issued in 
the UK. ***, ** and * indicates that the reported coefficients are significantly different from zero at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by transaction. 
 
 
Table 4.1.2 shows the differences between the pricing factors of ABS, MBS and 
CDOs in the U.S. vis-à-vis with W.E., presented in models [3], [4], and [5]. 
Starting with the main analysis, we can see that an issuance of ABS and CDOs 
in Continental Europe before the crisis represents a decrease of -22.32 bps (not 
significant) in model [3] and -126.41bps (significant at 1% level) in model [5] in 
the credit spread, respectively, if we compare with the North American market. 
In relation to MBS, model [4], despite the fact that the value is not statistically 
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significant we can verify that an issuance of this kind of security in Continental 
Europe adds on average more 13.31 bps on the credit spread than an issuance in 
the U.S. Being this variable only significant in model [5] we can state that CDOs 
have a lower credit spread before crisis in Continental Europe. 
If we take a look at the issuances during crisis, it turns out that for ABS issued 
in Continental Europe (W.E. crisis), model [3], the credit spread increases 21.49 
bps (significant at 5% level) in comparison to an issuance of this security type in 
the U.S. for the same period. For MBS and CDOs, the values are not significant 
during this period. 
After the first analysis of this table, the comparison between Continental 
Europe (W.E.) and the U.S. markets, it is important to refer the results that we 
achieved for the U.K. market. As it was evident in the model [2] from table 4.1.1 
the variable U.K. Borrowers was strongly responsible for increasing the value of 
the credit spreads (significant at 1% level). With no surprise, again in this table 
for the three security types, models [3], [4], and [5], the values for the U.K. are 
statistically significant and drastically positive. For instance, we can state that an 
issuance of ABS, model [3], made in the U.K. adds 92.83 bps (significant at 1% 
level) to the credit spread if we compare with the U.S. or W.E (Continental 
Europe). It takes the value of 86.91 bps (significant at 1% level) for MBS and 
176.30 bps (significant at 1% level) for CDOs. Again, we corroborate the findings 
of table 4.1.1, in which the U.K., the credit spreads are higher for AS bonds if we 
compare to the other two analysed regions. 
Introducing the variable Rated to this table, we can easily perceive that the 
main impact is seen in MBS, in model [4], being the impacts for all security types 
statistically significant at 1% level except for CDOs. Rated MBS have on average 
a reduction of -112.09 bps in the credit spread if we compare with not rated ones. 
For ABS the value is also negative, but just -61.95 and for CDOs the value 
continues to be negative but not so low as the previous security types, -22.93. One 
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more time we corroborate the fact that rated tranches have a lower credit spread 
than not rated ones. 
Regarding the rating of the rated tranches, as it happened in the previous table 
the relationship between rating and credit spread is positive and significant (the 
rating increases, increasing as well the expected probability of default, the spread 
also increases, revealing the market penalization for that probability increase). 
Thus, CDOs, model [5], being the riskiest security type, have the highest impact 
in this variable, 29.90 (significant at 1% level), meaning that an increase of one 
point in the rating scale, turns out to be an increase, on average, of 29.90 bps in 
the credit spread. Followed by ABS, model [3] with an impact of 18.40 (significant 
at 1% level) and MBS yielding a value of 17.33 (significant at 1% level). 
Transaction Size, as before is not a statistically significant variable, and also its 
impact in credit spread is quite null. 
As opposite from the first commented regression table, the variable Tranche to 
transaction is statistically significant for ABS and MBS. However, it turns out to 
not be significant for CDOs. It has a positive correlation for MBS, model [4], 
meaning that if the tranche to transaction increases by 1%, the credit spread of 
that tranche also increases, on average 0.05 bps (significant at 1% level). In 
contrast it has a negative correlation of -0.23 bps (significant at 1% level) per 1% 
increase, in ABS, model [3]. 
The callability factor of a tranche continues to be significant as before and has 
a positive correlation with the credit spread for ABS (0.60) (significant at 5% level) 
and MBS (14.23) (significant at 1% level). By contrast, for CDOs it has a negative 
correlation (-26.75) (significant at 1% level). 
The next variable introduced in the models was the Number of banks. 
Significant at 1% level for ABS and CDOs, models [3] and [5] and not significant 
for MBS, model [4]. As expected, this variable is inversely correlated with the 
credit spread (more banks involved in an AS bond transaction, the degree of 
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certification of the transaction tends to increase, leading to a decrease on the 
credit spread), yielding a value of -2.80 bps in model [3] and -13.248 bps in model 
[5]. In model [4], the value turns out to be -1.44 bps. As it can be understood 
CDOs, being the security type with more risk perceived by the market, require a 
very good certification of the transaction. Therefore, the increase of the number 
of banks involved, on average, decreases more the credit spread than on the other 
security types. 
Regarding Currency Risk, this variable is significant for model [4] and model 
[5] being the correlation with this variable and the credit spread negative for the 
three security types. By far, MBS, represented in model [4], are the security type 
in which the credit spread decreases more, if we compare a tranche with currency 
risk and another without this factor, being the difference -116 bps (significant at 
1% level) in credit spread. The difference reduces if we compare with model [5], 
-36.00 bps (significant at 1% level) and it reduces even more in model [3], -5.51 
bps (insignificant). 
By contrast with a plain vanilla bond, where if the maturity increases, the 
credit spread tends to increase as well, in AS bonds we found the opposite. In 
part, because the maturity in AS bonds is not completely dependent with an 
increase of uncertainty to forecast distant cash flows, but, in fact, it is dependent 
in the maturity of the collateral assets. Thus, we can predict better the value of 
these collateral assets when the AS bond matures. For the three analysed models, 
[3], [4], and [5], maturity turns out to be a significant (at 1%level) and negatively 
correlated variable with credit spread. In fact, an increase of 1% in the maturity 
yields a reduction of -1.42 bps on ABS, -1.38 bps on MBS and -0.54 bps on CDOs. 
Subordinated Debt has a positive correlation with credit spread in the three 
models but is only statistically significant (at 1% level) in model [4]. As known, 
this kind of debt is the most junior one, meaning that is the last one to be paid 
after the liquidation of the assets in case of default. It makes sense that a bond 
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like this should be penalized in terms of spread. Thus, in model [4] the value is 
positive 20.94 bps (in model [3] takes the value of 4.47bps and in model [5], 
5.80bps), which means that on average the credit spread for a subordinated 
tranche is higher 20.94 bps if we compare with a tranche with no subordinated 
debt. 
Fixed rate, once more as a highly significant (significant at 1% level) and 
positive impact on credit spread for all models [3], [4], and [5]. As it is expected 
the market castigates severally tranches with fixed rate issuances, since these 
tranches are not protected against interest rate movements as floating rate ones 
are. In a case of interest rate increase this is good for the issuer that does not have 
to pay it since the coupon rate is fixed. Although, if the interest rate decreases the 
issuer has to pay the agreed coupon, whereas it could pay a lower one if it was a 
floating rate issuance. Just in the case that if this fixed rate issuance is callable, 
the issuer is in part protected against interest rate movements. In model [3] the 
credit spread jumps 154 bps if we compare a fixed rate to a floating rate note, 148 
bps in model [4] and 117 bps if we look at model [5]. Indeed, we corroborate the 
à-priori expectation that fixed rate has a positive relation with credit spread. 
Country risk is also significant (at 1% level for models [3] and [4] and 5% level 
for model [5]) and positive for the three models, [3], [4], and [5]. As it was 
expected if the risk of a country increases, it also increases the expected 
probability of default. The treasury rates increase and the rates of the bond issued 
on that country also increase. Model [4], that shows the pricing determinants 
impacts for MBS, states that this security type is the most jeopardized one in a 
scenario of a country risk increase. An increase of one percent in the country risk 
scale, leads to an increment of 16.03 bps in the credit spread of an MBS, followed 
by 13.25 bps increase in the credit spread of an ABS, model [3] and 7.11 bps boost 
in the credit spread of a CDO, model [5]. In fact, we can corroborate the fact that 
country risk influences positively the credit spread in an AS bond transaction. 
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Regarding the Risk-Free Rate, used to compute the credit spread, once more, its 
correlation with the pricing of an AS bond is positive and significant. For model 
[3], we have the highest impact, an increase of 66.20 bps (significant at 1% level) 
per 1% increase in the risk-free rate, on average. Followed by model [5], 45.83 bps 
(significant at 1% level) and model [4] 21.77 bps (significant at 1% level). We can 
also corroborate the idea that the risk-free rate increases the credit spread in an 
AS transaction (it should be since the risk-free rate is also embedded in the 
computation of the credit spread). 
Volatility plays also a significant role in the determination of the credit spread, 
being its impact positive and statistically significant (at 1% level), in the three 
analysed models of table 4.1.2. In model [5], as we know CDOs are proved to be 
the riskiest security among the ones analysed, thus without no amazement per 
1% increase in the VIX index we expect a 3.18 bps increase, on average, in the 
credit spread of a CDO, holding all other variables constant. The value decreases 
to 2.43 bps if we analyse model [3] and gets even lower if look at model [4], 
yielding 2.12 bps. We can corroborate that an increase in volatility, leads to an 
increase of the credit spreads of AS bond (more uncertainty, means more risk, so 
the issuers have to pay a premium for that). 
Government yield, negatively correlated with the credit spread, being 
significant at the three classical levels for models [3] and [5] and just significant 
at 10% level in model [4]. It is normal that we have a negative relation between 
government yield and credit spread, because the spread is no more than the gap 
between YTM and government yield. Therefore, if the difference between the 
long-term government yield and the short-term one increases, this gap decreases. 
The highest value for this variable can be seen in model [3], -27.72 bps, followed 
by model [5], -23.13 bps and finally, model [4] -8.26 bps. Once more we 
corroborate that an increase in the gap between the long-term and short-term 
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government yield of a country reduce the credit spread of an AS bond 
transaction. 
GDP per capita turns out to be insignificant in model [3], and significant at 1% 
level in models [4] and [5]. However, its impact on credit spread is very weak, 
being almost zero. Indeed, we can conclude that GDP per capita influences the 
credit spread but we cannot state that it has a visible impact on it. 
Creditor Rights, has a significant impact (at 1% level for models [3] and [5] and 
5% level for model [4]) on credit spread for all the security types. In models [3] 
and [5] this impact is negative, although in model [4] it turns out to be positive. 
The values are -19.95 bps for model [3] and -40.63 bps for model [5], being the 
value for model [4], 3.86 bps. Hence, we can corroborate that for ABS and CDOs 
we have a negative impact on credit spread due to Laporta Creditor Rights, 
although we verify that for MBS we have a positive impact. 
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4.2 Robustness Checks  
In order to analyse the robustness of our results in the previous chapter we 
implemented two robustness checks. 
In the first robustness check we started by using the adjusted spread, in which 
floating rate bond spreads were converted into fixed rate bond spread using 
floating to fixed rate swaps, in order to standardize the issuance type in just one 
type. Therefore, we re-ran models [1] to [5] from tables 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, but this 
time the dependent variable was not the credit spread but in fact, the adjusted 
spread.  
In the second robustness check, we again re-ran model [2] from table 4.1.1 and 
models [3], [4], and [5] from table 4.1.2, but this time we add controller variables 
related to the bank issuer parent accounting and controllers for market 
characteristics. Moreover, the dependent variable of these linear regression was 
not the credit spread but the adjusted spread.  
For the issuer parent accounting variables, we used some key accounting 
ratios and variables, such as: Logarithm of Total Assets (Ln TA), Net Loans/ Total 
Assets (Net Loans/TA), Liquid Assets/ Deposits & Short-Term Funding (Liquid 
A/Deposits), Loans/Deposits & Short-Term Funding (Loans/Deposits), 
Equity/Total Assets (Equity/TA), and Cost to Income. 
The first robustness check table, table 4.2.1 regresses the adjusted spread on 
the same variables and controllers from models used in models [1] and [2] 
presented in table 4.1.1. 
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Dependent variable: [6] [7]
Adjusted Spread (bps)
ABS, MBS 
and CDO
ABS, MBS 
and CDO 
with UK
Independent variables:
Intercept 113.75 *** 149.21 ***
(5.10) (6.35)
W.E. before crisis -50.51 *** -65.80 ***
(-9.69) (-11.79)
W.E. crisis -7.07 -22.36 ***
(-1.17) (-3.29)
Rated -78.31 *** -77.11 ***
(-10.87) (-10.65)
Rated Rating 21.57 *** 21.63 ***
(78.55) (78.86)
Transaction Size 0.00 0.00
(-1.01) (-1.05)
Tranche to transaction -0.21 *** -0.19 ***
(-8.97) (-8.29)
Callable 7.90 *** 8.14 ***
(4.62) (4.77)
ABS -53.33 *** -53.43 ***
(-21.79) (-21.94)
MBS -43.71 *** -45.44 ***
(-14.86) (-15.45)
Number of banks -3.16 *** -3.29 ***
(-7.45) (-7.65)
Currency Risk 13.05 ** -10.54 *
(2.52) (-1.79)
Maturity -0.57 *** -0.55 ***
(-8.42) (-8.09)
Subordinated Debt 0.91 2.12
(0.45) (1.05)
Fixed Rate -61.36 *** -61.01 ***
(-32.79) (-32.58)
Country Risk 7.64 *** 8.51 ***
(5.37) (5.97)
Risk Free Rate -0.08 -0.33
(-0.05) (-0.21)
Volatility 0.49 ** 0.52 ***
(2.45) (2.65)
Government Yield -8.60 *** -10.10 ***
(-3.06) (-3.49)
GDP per capita 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
(7.99) (6.13)
Creditor Rights -4.28 *** -8.83 ***
(-3.33) (-6.70)
UK Borrowers - 51.22 ***
- (7.83)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of observations 62,121 62,151
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.52
Table 4.2.1: Regression analysis on the impact of the independent 
variables on the adjusted spread 
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Note: Table 4.2.1 presents the results of OLS regression analysis of the determinants of Asset 
Securitization Bonds from 2000 to 2016. Adjusted Spread is computed as the margin yielded (in 
bases points) by the security at issue above a corresponding currency treasury benchmark with a 
comparable maturity and in case of being a floating spread is added a floating to fix swap at the 
time of issuance with the corresponding maturity and floating rate to fix the coupon rate. W.E. 
before crisis is computed by giving 1 to all the observations of W.E. occurred before September 
15th 2008. W.E. crisis is computed by giving 1 to all the observations of W.E. occurred before 
September 15th 2008. Rated takes the value 1 if the tranche is rated. Rated Rating gives the rating 
according to the S&P credit rating scale at the time of the bond issuance; the rating is converted 
as follows: AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until D=22. Transaction Size gives the value of 
the transaction at the time of issuance in USD. Tranche to transaction is the percentage that the 
tranche has in the transaction. Callable takes the value one if the tranche is callable. ABS take the 
value one if the tranche refers to an ABS issuance. MBS takes the value one if the tranche refers 
to an MBS issuance. Number of banks gives the number of banks involved in the deal. Currency 
Risk takes the value 1 if the deal was done in a currency different from the one used in the country 
of issuance. Maturity is the maturity of the tranche in years. Subordinated Debt takes the value 
one if the debt related to the tranche is the last one to be paid. Fixed Rate takes the value one if 
the coupon of the tranche is a fixed rate one. Country Risk follows a scale of the risk of the country 
according to the year. Risk Free Rate gives the rate of the US 3-month treasury bills according t 
the time of the issuance. Volatility refers to the values of the Volatility Index (VIX). Government 
Yield presents the 10-year government yield of the country in which the bond was issued. GDP 
per capita per country in which the tranche was issued. Creditor Rights follows the Laporta’s 
Creditor Rights Scale. UK Borrowers takes the value one if the tranche was issued in the UK. ***, 
** and * indicates that the reported coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by transaction. 
 
In the above table, table 4.2.1, looking in general, the first thing that catches 
the attention is that fact that for both models, [6] and [7] the coefficients for 
variables W.E. before crisis and W.E. crisis are negative. This is in fact different 
from the analysis that we took from table 4.1.1 
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Looking deeply at models [6] and [7] (model without U.K. borrowers and with 
U.K. borrowers) presented on table 4.2.2, we verify that the variable W.E. before 
crisis is significant at the three classical levels and takes the value of -50.51bps in 
model [6] and -65.81bps in model [7]. In comparison to models [1] and [2] from 
table 4.1.1 we can see a reduction from 26.60bps (model [1]) to -50.51bps (model 
[6]) and a decrease from -45.98bps (model [2]) to -65.80bps (model [7]). Regarding 
the variable W.E. crisis, it is insignificant in model [6] and significant at 1% level 
in model [7]. Again, the variable takes negatives values, -7.07bps in model [6], 
and -22.36bps in model [7]. Comparing to models [1] and [2] it is easy to conclude 
that we have a decrease in values again from 74.16 in model [1] to -7.07 in model 
[6] and from 20.88 in model [2] to -22.36 in model [7]. Hence, this allows us to say 
that we cannot corroborate the findings of table 4.1.1 regarding the credit spread 
of AS bonds issued in W.E. being higher than the ones for AS bonds issued in the 
U.S. (model [1] vis-à-cis with model [6]). Although, we can corroborate the 
findings from table 4.1.1 model [2], where we concluded that the fact of an AS 
bond being issued in Continental Europe reduces the credit spread of the tranche. 
Taking a look now at the variable UK borrowers presented in model [7], we 
can see that the value remains positive (with a significance level of 1%), 51.22bps 
but if we compare with model [2], we conclude that we had a substantial 
difference, since the value for this variable was 130.61bps. Henceforth, we can 
corroborate the fact that the U.K. is responsible for highest credit spreads and is 
the region that increases the credit spreads for AS bonds issued in W.E. 
Regarding the other control variables used in models [1] and [2], from table 
4.1.1], and also in models [6] and [7], shown in table 4.2.1, if we consider Rated, 
Rated Rating, Transaction Size, Tranche to Transaction, Callable, ABS, MBS, Number 
of Banks, Maturity, Country Risk, Volatility, Government Yield, GDP per capita, and 
Creditor Rights the differences between models are not significant.  
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For Rated, the coefficients continue to be negative (significant at 1% level), if 
we compare models [1] with [6] and [2] with [7]. Therefore we corroborate the 
findings in table 4.1.1 stating that rated tranches have a lower credit spread than 
not rated ones. 
Analysing Rated Rating, the coefficients for this variable in all models, [1], [2], 
[6], and [7] are positive (significant at 1% level), which means that we also 
corroborate the allegation that if rating is downgraded the credit spread increases 
(if rating increases in our scale, credit spread also increases). 
Regarding Transaction Size, the coefficients in models [6] and [7] are not 
significant as it happened in models [1] and [2], so we continue to not validate 
the hypothesis that transaction size affects the credit spread. 
Looking at variable Callable, the coefficients are positive (significant at 1% 
level) in models [6] and [7] and were also positive in models [1] (significant at 5% 
level) and [2] (significant at 1% level), which lead us to the conclusion that 
callability impacts positively the credit spread. 
For variables ABS and MBS, the values continue to be negative (significant at 
1% level) as it was for models [1] and [2], which allow us to verify that CDOs are 
the security type associated with the highest credit spread. 
For the variable Number of Banks, the coefficients for this variable in models [6] 
and [7] remain negative (significant at 1 % level) as it happened for models [1] 
and [2]. Once more we corroborate the fact that an increase in the number of 
banks running the operation decreases the credit spread of the issuance. 
Regarding Maturity, we can also verify that the coefficients in models [6] and 
[7] remain negative (significant at 1% level) as they were in models presented in 
table 4.1.1, therefore we can validate the findings in that table, in which an 
increase in maturity reflects a decrease in the credit spreads. 
Country Risk coefficients for models in table 4.2.1 continue to be positive 
(significant at 1% level) like the ones for the same variable in models [1] and [2]. 
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Hence we can verify table 4.1.1 findings in which an increase in the country risk 
is associated to an increase in the credit spread. 
Nonetheless, for currency risk we can see that the value in model [1] was -
25.49bps (significant at 1% level), whereas in model [6] it changed to 13.05bps 
(significant at 5% level). Regarding model [7] the value of this variable is -
10.54bps (significant at 10% level), contrasting with -64.88bps (not significant) in 
model [2]. 
Also, for subordinated debt we assist to a strong change. The values in model 
[1] and [2] for this variable, 22.27bps (significant at 1% level) and 23.04bps 
(significant at 1% level), respectively, changed to 0.91bps (not significant) in 
model [6] and 2.12bps (not significant) in model [7]. 
Moreover, fixed rate variable changes from 143.53bps (significant at 1% level) 
in model [1] and 146.93bps (significant at 1% level), to -61.36bps (significant at 
1% level) in model [6] and -61.01bps (significant at 1% level) in model [7]. 
Finally, Risk Free Rate coefficients also change from models [1] and [2] 
presented in table 4.1.1, if we compare the coefficients for the same variable in 
models [6] and [7] from table 4.2.1. In fact, in model [1] that value is 51.20 
(significant at 1% level), and 50.97 (significant at 1% level) in model [2]. In model 
[6] the coefficient is now -0.08 (not significant) and -0.33 in model [7] (not 
significant). 
Looking at Volatility, the coefficients are still positive in model [6] (significant 
at 5% level) and model [7] (significant at 1% level), as the one in models [1] and 
[2] (significant at 1% level). Henceforth, we corroborate the fact that volatility 
impacts positively the credit spread. 
For Government Yield, the coefficients are negative in models [6] and [7] 
(significant at 1% level), the same as in model [1] (significant at 5% level) and 
model [2] (significant at 1% level). Therefore, we can corroborate that an increase 
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in the gap between the long-term yield and short-term yield, reduces the credit 
spread. 
Regarding GDP per capita, the coefficients continue to be roughly zero 
(significant at 1% level) as for models [1] and [2] (significant at 1% level), which 
means that we corroborate the findings of table 4.1.1 for this variable, having 
GDP per capita a very slightly positive impact on credit spread. 
For Creditor Rights, the coefficients for this variable in models [6] and [7] are 
negative (significant at 1% level), as they were in models [1] and [2] (significant 
at 1% level). Consequently, we corroborate the findings of table 4.1.1 in which an 
increase in Creditor Rights is associated to a decrease in the credit spread.  
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Dependent variable: [8] [9] [10]
Adjusted Spread (bps) ABS MBS CDO
Independent variables:
Intercept 94.65 ** 160.46 *** 341.36 ***
(2.10) (4.01) (5.10)
W.E. before crisis -7.86 -77.86 *** -89.00 ***
(-0.63) (-9.25) (-7.04)
W.E. after crisis -12.04 -0.27 -41.38 *
(-1.37) (-0.02) (-1.91)
Rated -75.31 *** -109.24 *** -6.68
(-8.84) (-7.57) (-0.43)
Rated Rating 19.51 *** 14.64 *** 29.66 ***
(62.04) (21.83) (48.55)
Transaction Size -0.01 *** 0.00 0.00
(-3.89) (0.52) (-1.00)
Tranche to transaction -0.27 *** -0.31 *** -0.09
(-10.36) (-6.92) (-1.47)
Callable 0.08 12.96 *** -11.59 **
(0.18) (5.26) (-2.34)
Number of banks -1.35 *** -1.32 -13.63 ***
(-2.80) (-1.43) (-6.18)
Currency Risk -4.83 4.41 -32.53 ***
(-0.46) (0.57) (-3.40)
Maturity 0.41 *** -1.41 *** 0.30 **
(4.10) (-9.63) (2.30)
Subordinated Debt -16.72 *** 21.24 *** -1.74
(-6.93) (4.10) (-0.36)
Fixed Rate -50.32 *** -57.61 *** -84.39 ***
(-20.20) (-18.07) (-12.12)
Country Risk 17.54 *** 7.81 ** 0.71
(7.12) (2.33) (0.20)
Risk Free Rate 1.32 3.18 -9.37 *
(0.64) (1.26) (-1.84)
Volatility 0.67 ** 0.13 1.65 ***
(2.59) (0.42) (3.18)
Government Yield -10.54 *** -13.72 ** -6.23
(-3.72) (-2.17) (-1.06)
GDP per capita 0.01 *** 0.00 *** 0.00
(6.48) (3.80) (-1.26)
Creditor Rights -7.26 *** -4.31 *** -17.09 ***
(-2.69) (-2.64) (-5.11)
UK Borrowers 65.34 *** 13.73 88.90 ***
(5.76) (1.44) (5.70)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 34,811 17,396 9,914
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.33 0.63
Table 4.2.2.: Regression analysis on the impact of the independent variables on 
the adjusted spread for each security type, ABS, MBS, and CDOs 
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Note: Table 4.2.2 presents the results of OLS regression analysis of the determinants of Asset 
Securitization Bonds from 2000 to 2016, split by security type. Adjusted Spread is computed as 
the margin yielded (in bases points) by the security at issue above a corresponding currency 
treasury benchmark with a comparable maturity and in case of being a floating spread is added 
a floating to fix swap at the time of issuance with the corresponding maturity and floating rate to 
fix the coupon rate. W.E. before crisis is computed by giving 1 to all the observations of W.E. 
occurred before September 15th 2008. W.E. crisis is computed by giving 1 to all the observations 
of W.E. occurred before September 15th 2008. Rated takes the value 1 if the tranche is rated. Rated 
Rating gives the rating according to the S&P credit rating scale at the time of the bond issuance; 
the rating is converted as follows: AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until D=22. Transaction 
Size gives the value of the transaction at the time of issuance in USD. Tranche to transaction is 
the percentage that the tranche has in the transaction. Callable takes the value one if the tranche 
is callable. Number of banks gives the number of banks involved in the deal. Currency Risk takes 
the value 1 if the deal was done in a currency different from the one used in the country of 
issuance. Maturity is the maturity of the tranche in years. Subordinated Debt takes the value one 
if the debt related to the tranche is the last one to be paid. Fixed Rate takes the value one if the 
coupon of the tranche is a fixed rate one. Country Risk follows a scale of the risk of the country 
according to the year. Risk Free Rate gives the rate of the US 3-month treasury bills according t 
the time of the issuance. Volatility refers to the values of the Volatility Index (VIX). Government 
Yield presents the 10-year government yield of the country in which the bond was issued. GDP 
per capita per country in which the tranche was issued. Creditor Rights follows the Laporta’s 
Creditor Rights Scale. UK Borrowers takes the value one if the tranche was issued in the UK. ***, 
** and * indicates that the reported coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by transaction. 
            
 
In table 4.2.2 we have the same variables as in table 4.1.2, but this time as we 
previously did in table 4.2.1, we regressed adjusted spread instead of credit 
spread for models [8], [9], and [10], in order to compare the difference in 
coefficients for the same variables that we had in table 4.1.2. Therefore, we aim 
to compare model [8] with model [3], model [9] with model [4] and model [10] 
with model [5]. 
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Starting with the variable W.E. before crisis is possible to see that the 
coefficients are all negative for models [8], [9] and [10]. Comparing these models 
with models from table 4.1.2, we see that the value changes from -126.41bps 
(significant at 1% level) in model [5] to -89.00bps (significant at 1% level) in model 
[10], and we can corroborate the idea that the spreads for CDOs issued in 
Continental Europe before crisis are lower than the ones in the U.S. and in the 
U.K. However, the coefficient for W.E. before crisis changes from 13.31bps (not 
significant) in model [4] to -77.86bps (significant at 1% level) in model [9]. Hence, 
since the coefficient was not significant in model [4] and is now in model [9] we 
can conclude that the credit spreads for MBS issued in Continental Europe before 
crisis are lower than the ones for MBS issuances in the U.S. and in the U.K.  
Finally, in model [8] from table 4.2.2 the value for W.E. before crisis is -7.86 (not 
significant), contrasting with the value of -22.32 (not significant) in model [3]. 
Henceforth, since the variable’s coefficient continues to be insignificant we 
cannot take any conclusion. 
Looking at W.E. crisis, starting with model [8], the coefficient is now -12.04 
(not significant), different from 21.49 (significant at 5%) in model [3]. Regarding 
model [9] coefficient for this variable it is -0.27 (not significant), contrasting with 
18.84 (not significant) in model [4]. Finally, for W.E. crisis the coefficient in model 
[10] is -41.38 (significant at 10%), distinct from -23.89 (not significant) in model 
[5] 
Looking now at U.K. Borrowers’ variable it is evident that the coefficients for 
all models in table 4.2.1.2 continue to be positive. In relation to model [8] the 
value does not suffer considerable alterations if we compare with model [3]. It 
changes from 92.83bps (significant at 1% level) in model [3] to 65.34bps 
(significant at 1% level) in model [8]. We can corroborate the hypothesis that the 
credit spreads for ABS issued in the U.K. are indeed higher than the ones for ABS 
issuances in the U.S. and Continental Europe. If we analyse models [4] and [9] 
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the shift from 86.90bps (significant at 1% level) in model [4] to 13.73bps (not 
significant) in model [9] is more considerable. However, we cannot corroborate 
the previous conclusions of table 4.1.2 since the value in table 4.2.2 is not 
significant. Lastly, for models [5] and [10] the value decreases from 176.30bps 
(significant at 1% level) in model [5] to 88.90bps (significant at 1% level) in model 
[10]. Therefore, we can also corroborate the hypothesis that credit spreads for 
CDOs issued in the U.K. are higher than the ones for CDOs issued in the U.S. and 
Continental Europe. 
For the variables Rated, Rated Rating, Transaction Size, Tranche to Transaction, 
Callable, Number of Banks, Maturity, Volatility, and GDP per capita the differences 
between models are not significant. Therefore, we can corroborate the findings 
of table 4.1.2. 
For the variable Rated we can corroborate the hypothesis that for ABS and MBS 
issuances, the fact that tranche is rated reduces the credit spread of the issuance. 
Moreover, for CDOs, since in both models, [5] and [10] the values are not 
significant we cannot conclude anything. 
Regarding the variable Rated Rating, the main conclusion is that we 
corroborate the fact that for all the three types of securities if the rating is 
downgraded the credit spread of the tranche increases. 
If you compare Tranche to Transaction between tables 4.1.2 and 5.2 we can 
corroborate the fact that for ABS if the tranche to transaction increases, it leads to 
a reduction in the credit spread. 
Regarding the variable Callable it is also possible to corroborate that if we are 
analysing an MBS issuance, the fact of being callable increases the credit spread 
of the tranche. By contrast if we are talking about a CDOs issuance the callability 
option in the issuance reduces the credit spread. 
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Analysing the Number of Banks variable, it is possible to corroborate that for 
ABS and CDOs issuances the increase in the number of banks running the 
operation leads to a decrease in the credit spread. 
In terms of Maturity, we can only corroborate that for an MBS issuance if the 
maturity increases the credit spread of the issued tranche decreases. 
Regarding Volatility we can corroborate the previous findings of table 4.1.2 for 
ABS and CDOs issuances that state that if the volatility increases it happens the 
same to the credit spread. 
For Currency Risk, we can assist at a significant change if we compare the 
values between models [4] and [9]. In fact, the coefficient from this variable 
changes from -116.37 (significant at 1% level) in model [4] to 4.41 (not significant) 
in model [9]. Regarding model [5], in which the coefficient is -36.07 (significant 
at 1% level), it roughly keeps the same value -32.53 (significant at 1% level) in 
model [10]. We can corroborate that currency risk decreases the credit spread of 
a CDOs issuance  
Subordinated Debt changes are also evident for model [8]. Firstly, the 
coefficient for this variable changes from 4.47bps (not significant) in model [3] to 
-16.72bps (significant at 1% level) in model [8], meaning that now subordinated 
debt for this security type has in fact a negative impact in the credit spread.  
Fixed rate is a variable that accuses the differences in terms of credit spread 
vis-à-vis with adjusted spread for all security types. For model [3], the initial 
coefficient was 153.57bps (significant at 1% level) yielding now -50.32bps 
(significant at 1% level) in model [8]. The same happened between model [4], in 
which the value for the variable was 147.64 (significant at 1% level) and it is -
57.61 (significant at 1% level) in model [9]. Additionally, this decrease in 
coefficient values is also evident between model [5], where the coefficient is 
116.68 (significant at 1% level), contrary to the coefficient of -84.39 (significant at 
1% level) in model [10]. In fact, the values became negative if we use the adjusted 
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spread instead of credit spread, stating that fixed rate as indeed a negative impact 
in the spread of the bonds. We cannot corroborate the idea that fixed rate 
positively influences the credit spread. 
In addition, Country Risk variable suffers expressive changes in the 
coefficients for models [9] and [10].  In model [4] the value was 16.03 (significant 
at 1% level) and in model [9] it continues to be positive, 7.81 (significant at 5% 
level). In model [5] the coefficient of this variable, decreases from 7.11bps 
(significant at 5% level) to 0.71 in model [10] (insignificant). If we compare 
models [3] and [8] we can corroborate that for ABS issuances the Country Risk, 
indeed increases the credit spread. We can also corroborate the fact that for MBS 
issuance, the country risk increases the credit spread. 
The next variable in which is possible to see the changes from table 4.1.2 to 
table 4.2.2 is the Risk-Free Rate. Starting with the comparisons between models 
[3] and [8], the coefficients were 66.20 (significant at 1% level) in model [3], 
different from 1.32 (insignificant) in model [8]. In model [4] the value was 21.77 
(significant at 1% level), contrasting with 3.18 (insignificant) in model [9]. Finally, 
the coefficient was also positive, 45.83 (significant at 1% level) in model [5], and 
-9.37 (significant at 10% level) in model [10]. Therefore, we cannot corroborate 
the findings in table 4.1.2, regarding the variable Risk-Free Rate.  
Government Yield also suffers some changes in all the three models from table 
4.2.2 in comparison to table 4.1.2. Firstly, comparing model [3], in which the 
coefficient for this variable yield -27.72 (significant at 1% level) with model [8], 
where the coefficient takes the value of -10.54 (significant at 1% level) we can 
corroborate the hypothesis that Government Yield decreases the credit spread for 
ABS issuances. Moreover, in model [4] the coefficient for this variable takes the 
value of -8.26 (significant at 10% level), whereas in model [9] the value is now -
13.72 (significant at 5% level). Naturally, we can corroborate the hypothesis that 
Government Yield increases, also reduce the credit spread for MBS issuances. 
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Finally, if we compare model [5], in which the coefficient takes the value of -23.13 
(significant at 1% level) with model [10] in which the value for this variable is -
6.23 (not significant) we do not corroborate the hypothesis that Government 
Yield reduces the credit spread of a CDOs issuance.   
The last variable that evidences the changes between the use of adjusted 
spread in comparison with the use of credit spread is Creditor Rights. In fact, in 
model [3] it takes the value of -19.95 (significant at 1% level), whereas in model 
[8] it takes the value of -7.26 (significant at 1% level). By contrast the coefficient 
is positive in model [4], 3.86 (significant at 1% level) and negative in model [9], -
4.31 (significant at 1% level). In model [5] the value is -40.63 (significant at 1% 
level, continuing to be negative in model [10], -17.09 (significant at 1% level). 
Indeed, we can corroborate that in countries in which the Creditor Rights are 
higher, it is reflected in a credit spread reduction for ABS and CDOs issuances, 
although regarding MBS issuances we cannot corroborate the findings of table 
4.1.2. 
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Dependent variable: [11] [11a] [11b] [11c]
Adjusted Spread (bps)
ABS, MBS 
and CDO
ABS MBS CDO
Independent variables:
Intercept 214.77 *** -89.39 284.79 ** 86.64
(2.93) (-1.02) (2.49) (0.43)
W.E. before crisis -42.44 *** 44.22 ** -65.98 *** -34.27
(-3.50) (2.39) (-3.34) (-1.36)
W.E. crisis -51.82 *** 9.98 -83.02 ** 5.42
(-2.84) (0.53) (-2.44) (0.14)
Rated -81.33 *** -82.72 *** -99.78 *** -44.11
(-4.83) (-5.69) (-3.73) (-0.57)
Rated Rating 19.16 *** 18.68 *** 17.34 *** 28.43 ***
(41.84) (40.20) (14.29) (13.81)
Transaction Size 0.00 *** -0.01 *** 0.00 -0.01
(-2.77) (-3.52) (-0.85) (-1.50)
Tranche to transaction -0.09 ** -0.23 *** 0.52 *** 0.07
(-2.23) (-4.60) (5.80) (0.45)
Callable -0.33 1.71 13.98 ** -36.76 ***
(-0.08) (0.36) (1.86) (-2.66)
ABS -41.57 *** - - -
(-5.40) - - -
MBS -29.15 *** - - -
(-3.52) - - -
Number of banks -1.49 1.23 -0.25 2.65
(-1.59) (1.32) (-0.14) (0.52)
Currency Risk 11.74 1.26 23.98 *** 15.30
(1.38) (0.10) (2.57) (0.69)
Maturity -0.51 *** 0.35 -2.09 *** -0.40
(-3.49) (1.58) (-7.63) (-0.94)
Subordinated Debt -11.03 *** -17.73 *** 11.24 -16.67
(-2.74) (-4.54) (1.23) (-1.33)
Fixed Rate -78.45 *** -68.79 *** -61.37 *** -68.07 ***
(-16.12) (-10.58) (-6.60) (-3.70)
Country Risk 9.70 *** 19.32 *** 6.79 -61.89 ***
(4.20) (5.29) (1.36) (-3.26)
Risk Free Rate -5.94 * -1.11 -16.75 *** -22.16
(-1.85) (-0.31) (-2.61) (-1.56)
Volatility 0.40 1.23 *** -0.43 2.20
(1.12) (2.86) (-0.83) (1.30)
Government Yield 3.02 -1.83 6.73 31.63 *
(0.72) (-0.51) (0.86) (1.76)
GDP per capita 0.00 *** 0.01 *** 0.00 0.00
(2.80) (5.11) (-0.90) (0.97)
Creditor Rights -4.07 * 1.96 -9.36 ** -5.35
(-1.67) (0.30) (-2.13) (-0.76)
UK Borrowers 7.77 -7.73 30.00 -32.16
(0.63) (-0.47) (1.52) (-0.99)
Ln TA -0.31 0.37 2.17 -1.12
(-0.20) -0.21 (0.69) (-0.20)
Net Loans/TA -0.50 ** -0.17 -0.61 -1.52 ***
(-2.49) (-0.68) (-1.50) (-2.78)
Liquid A/Deposits -0.02 0.01 -0.10 -0.19
(-0.35) (0.15) (-1.06) (-0.98)
Loans/Deposits 0.04 0.00 0.25 ** -0.05
(0.51) (-0.04) (1.96) (-0.31)
Equity/TA 1.11 * 2.24 *** 0.40 1.71
(1.78) (2.97) (0.37) (0.98)
Cost to Income -0.22 *** 0.46 ** -0.28 ** -1.62 **
(-1.55) (2.40) (-2.07) (-2.42)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 13,213 9,263 3,172 778
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.55 0.41 0.63
Table 4.1.3: Regression analysis on the impact of the independent variables plus the issuer parent 
details on the adjusted spread 
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Note: Table 4.2.3 presents the results of OLS regression analysis of the determinants of Asset 
Securitization Bonds from 2000 to 2016, and also the split by security type. Adjusted Spread is 
computed as the margin yielded (in bases points) by the security at issue above a corresponding 
currency treasury benchmark with a comparable maturity and in case of being a floating spread 
is added a floating to fix swap at the time of issuance with the corresponding maturity and 
floating rate to fix the coupon rate. W.E. before crisis is computed by giving 1 to all the 
observations of W.E. occurred before September 15th 2008. W.E. crisis is computed by giving 1 to 
all the observations of W.E. occurred before September 15th 2008. Rated takes the value 1 if the 
tranche is rated. Rated Rating gives the rating according to the S&P credit rating scale at the time 
of the bond issuance; the rating is converted as follows: AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until 
D=22. Transaction Size gives the value of the transaction at the time of issuance in USD. Tranche 
to transaction is the percentage that the tranche has in the transaction. Callable takes the value 
one if the tranche is callable. ABS takes the value one if the tranche refers to an ABS issuance. 
MBS takes the value one if the tranche refers to an MBS issuance. Number of banks gives the 
number of banks involved in the deal. Currency Risk takes the value 1 if the deal was done in a 
currency different from the one used in the country of issuance. Maturity is the maturity of the 
tranche in years. Subordinated Debt takes the value one if the debt related to the tranche is the 
last one to be paid. Fixed Rate takes the value one if the coupon of the tranche is a fixed rate one. 
Country Risk follows a scale of the risk of the country according to the year. Risk Free Rate gives 
the rate of the US 3-month treasury bills according t the time of the issuance. Volatility refers to 
the values of the Volatility Index (VIX). Government Yield presents the 10-year government yield 
of the country in which the bond was issued. GDP per capita per country in which the tranche 
was issued. Creditor Rights follows the Laporta’s Creditor Rights Scale. UK Borrowers takes the 
value one if the tranche was issued in the UK. Ln TA presents the natural logarithm of total assets 
for the issuer bank at the year of issuance. Net Loans/TA provides the ratio of short and long-
term loans divided by the Total Assets of the issuer bank at the time of the issuance. Liquid 
A/Deposits presents the assets that can be converted in cash instantaneously in cash divided by 
the total amount deposits of the issuer bank at the time of the issuance. Loans/Deposits presents 
the total amount of issued credit divided by the total amount of deposits of the issuer bank at the 
time of issuance. Equity/TA provides the capital ratio of the issuer bank at the time of the 
issuance. Cost to Income presents the ratio of operating costs over operating income for the issuer 
bank at the year of the issuance. ***, ** and * indicates that the reported coefficients are 
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics 
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reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by 
transaction. 
 
The last robustness check is available in table 4.2.3, that contains four models, 
[11], [11a], [11b] and [11c]. As it was done before, we have in this table model [11] 
that regresses adjusted spread in order to the same independent variables as 
before. In addition, we used as additional controllers the issuer parent details 
mentioned before. For models [11a], [11b], and [11c], we used the same variables 
(dependent and independent), but this time each model just uses the 
observations of each security type as it was done in tables 4.1.2 and 4.2.2. 
Starting with model [11] is possible to perceive that for the variable W.E. before 
crisis the coefficient is now, -42.44 (significant at 1% level), being -45.98 
(significant at 1% level) in model [2] and -65.80 (significant at 1% level) in model 
[7]. Clearly, we can conclude that the credit spread of AS bonds issued in 
Continental Europe before crisis is lower than the one for AS bonds issued in the 
U.S. and in the U.K. 
For the variable W.E. crisis, in model [11] the coefficient of this variable is now 
negative -51.82 (significant at 1% level), if we compare with models [2], in which 
the value was 20.88 (significant at 1% level) and model [7] in which it was also 
negative, -22.36 (significant at 1% level). Henceforth, we can corroborate the 
hypothesis presented in model [7], considering that the credit spreads in 
Continental Europe during the crisis period were lower than in the U.S. and in 
the U.K. However, this is against the findings presented in table 4.1.2 
The last variable analysing the differences between regions is UK Borrowers. In 
model [11] the coefficient for this variable is now 7.77 (not significant). Though, 
using this information, model [11] cannot corroborate any findings presented in 
model [2] or [7]. 
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Continuing the analysis of table 4.2.3, we should now look deeply into models 
[11a], [11b], and [11c], more specifically to the variables W.E. before crisis, W.E. 
crisis and UK Borrowers. 
Starting with the variable W.E. before crisis in model [11a] we can perceive that 
it is positive, 44.22 (significant at 5% level), being -22.32 (not significant) in model 
[3] and -7.86 (not significant in model [8]). Clearly for ABS we cannot corroborate 
the initial idea from models [3] and [8] that the credit spreads in Continental 
Europe before crisis are not significant. If we now analyse the same variable for 
model [11b] it has a coefficient of -65.98 (significant at 1% level), similar to -77.86 
(significant at 1% level) in model [9] and different from 13.31 (not significant) in 
model [4]. Once more the models presented in robustness checks give different 
values for this variable, which lead us to the conclusion that, in fact, the credit 
spreads for MBS issued in Continental Europe during crisis period are lower than 
the ones issued in the U.S and in the U.K. Finally, for model [11c] the variable 
takes now the value of -34.27 (not significant) different from -126.41 (significant 
at 1% level) in model [5] and -89.00 (significant at 1% level) in model [10]. Hence, 
since the coefficient for this variable is insignificant in model [11c] we cannot 
corroborate the initial statement that, indeed, the credit spread for CDOs issued 
in Continental Europe before crisis is lower than in the U.S and in the U.K. 
Regarding W.E. crisis, and starting again with model [11a], the coefficient is 
positive, 9.98 (insignificant), previously negative, -12.04 (insignificant) in model 
[8] and positive 21.49 (significant at 5% level) in model [3]. In this case it is not 
possible to verify the conclusion taken in model [3], although, we can corroborate 
the findings of model [8]. We cannot take any conclusion on how this variable 
affects the credit spread since it is not significant. Turning our attention to model 
[11b], the variable W.E. crisis coefficient yield the value of -83.02 (significant at 
5% level). Previously it took the coefficient of 18.84 (insignificant) in model [4] 
and -0.27 (not significant) in model [9]. Finally, for model [11c] the variable yields 
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5.42 (not significant), however in model [5] it was negative, -23.89 (insignificant), 
and also negative, -41.38 (significant at 10% level) in model [10]. Thus, we cannot 
state any evidence about the CDOs issuances in Continental Europe during crisis 
period. 
Lastly, for the variable UK Borrowers in models [11a], [11b], and [11c] the 
coefficients are: -7.73 (not significant), 30.00 (not significant), and -32.16 (not 
significant), contrasting with, 65.34 (significant at 1% level) in model [8], 13.73 
(not significant) in model [9], and 88.90 (significant at 1% level) in model [10], 
and 92.83 (significant at 1% level) in model [3], 86.90 (significant at 1% level) in 
model [4], and 176.30 (significant at 1% level) in model [5]. In fact, this model 
does not corroborate the thesis that issuances in the UK for ABS, MBS and CDOs 
have a higher credit spread, since the coefficients for this variable are 
insignificant. 
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5 Answers to the formulated hypotheses 
 
1. Credit spreads and pricing characteristics differ significantly between AS 
bonds issued in the U.S. versus W.E. 
 
After the analysis of table 3.3.1. is possible for us to conclude that using the 
same pricing characteristics for AS bonds issued in the U.S. and W.E. we end up 
having different credit spreads as well as different pricing determinants impacts 
between the analysed regions.  
In fact, the average and the median credit spread is noticeable different 
between the two regions if we look at all the AS bonds issuances of the sample, 
being the U.S. and W.E. samples significantly different at 5%. Additionally, if we 
split our sample in securities as it was done in table 3.3.2 we continue to conclude 
that for ABS, MBS and CDOs the mean and median of the credit spreads differs 
between the U.S. and W.E. In fact, the difference of means between the U.S. and 
W.E. samples are significant at 1% level for MBS and CDOs and at 5% level for 
ABS 
In relation to the pricing characteristics, regarding the previous literature 
findings it was assumed that the credit spreads of the U.S. and W.E. are impacted 
by the same pricing characteristics.  
Therefore, the pricing determinants used were the same for the U.S. and W.E. 
sample, however the impacts on credit spreads were different, as verified by the 
difference of means between the two samples that is statistically significant at 1% 
level. 
If we split the analysis of the pricing factors by security type, as it was done in 
table 3.3.2, we continue to conclude that the samples are differently affected by 
the same pricing determinants, due to the 1% level of significance difference 
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between the samples, except for CDOs Credit Rating in which the difference of 
means between the samples is not statistically significant. 
Indeed, we corroborate, the hypothesis that credit spreads and pricing 
characteristics differ between AS bonds issued in the U.S. versus W.E. 
 
2. AS bonds credit spread is higher in the U.S. than in W.E. 
 
Again, reviewing table 3.3.1, and the answer to the first hypothesis we 
corroborated it. Thus, the credit spreads for AS bonds issued in the U.S. and in 
W.E. are different, and by analysing in different way table 3.3.1 is possible to 
highlight that not just the mean but also the median for credit spreads is higher 
for AS bonds issued in the U.S. In reality this was an à-priori expectation since at 
least after the crisis ECB launched three programmes to buy these kinds of 
securities, which made the credit spread to decrease. Moreover, the financial 
crisis was triggered in the U.S. and investors lost more confidence in this market, 
penalizing more the issuers in the spreads required. 
Detailing this evidence presented in table 3.3.1, we can analyse once again 
table 3.3.2, in which we can divide the average and median credit spread by 
securities. As a matter of fact, the average and median credit spread for MBS are 
much higher in the U.S. rather than in W.E. Likewise, the mean and the median 
credit spreads for CDOs are higher in the U.S. vis-à-vis with W.E. By contrast, 
the average credit spread of ABS in W.E. is higher than the average credit spread 
in the U.S., which does not happen with the median that is lower in W.E. 
Until now we have strong evidences that the credit spreads in the U.S. are 
higher than in W.E. 
To confirm our hypothesis some linear regression models were conducted, 
and the results helped to take more prosperous conclusions. 
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Firstly, in table 4.1.1, model [1] we can see that we have positive coefficients 
for the variables W.E. before crisis and W.E. crisis (with a significance level of 
1%), which means that an AS bond issued in W.E. has on average a higher credit 
spread than one issued in the U.S. However, if we control for UK borrowers, like 
in table 4.1.1 model [2] we understand that the coefficient for the variable W.E. 
before crisis is now negative (with a significance level of 1%) and W.E. crisis is 
still positive (with a significance level of 1%) but decreases significantly. Finally, 
the coefficient for the variable U.K. borrowers is extremely high (with a 
significance level of 1%), yielding 130.61. Therefore, we can conclude that in the 
U.K. the credit spreads are higher than in the U.S. and in Continental Europe. 
Splitting the overall analysis of the credit spreads differences by region into 
security types, we have to analyse table 4.1.2. models [3], [4], and [5]. 
Starting with model [3] the variable W.E. before crisis takes a negative value 
(-22.32), although it is not significant. As opposite variable W.E. crisis and U.K. 
borrowers take positive values, 21.49 (significant at a 5% level) and 92.83 
(significant at 1% level) which means that an issuance of ABS in Continental 
Europe during crisis period and an issuance in the U.K. have both higher credit 
spreads than an ABS issuance in the U.S. 
In model [4], despite the fact that variables W.E. before crisis and W.E. crisis 
have positive values, 13.31 and 18.84, the values are not significant. By contrast 
the variable U.K. Borrowers in this model is positive, 86.90 (significant at 1% 
level) which leads to the conclusion that, once again the issuances of MBS in the 
U.K. have higher credit spreads than in the U.S. and Continental Europe. 
In the last model of table 4.1.2, model [5], the variable W.E. before crisis takes 
a negative value of -126.41 (significant at 1% level) and W.E. crisis takes also a 
negative value of -23.89, but this time it is not significant. The variable U.K. 
borrowers is one more time positive, 176.30 (significant at 1%level). As for the 
models [2], [3] and [4], model [5] verifies the evidence that also for CDOs an 
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issuance in the U.K. represents an increase in the credit spreads if we compare to 
the U.S. and Continental Europe. 
Adding up the findings achieved in tables 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 as the robustness 
checks for models [1] to [5] we can corroborate some findings. 
 In model [6] presented in table 4.2.1 we do not corroborate the findings of 
model [1], for the variable W.E. before crisis. Although, in model [7] we 
corroborate that credit spreads in Continental Europe before crisis are lower than 
in the U.K. and in the U.S. For variable W.E. crisis we do not corroborate with 
models [6] and [7] the findings of models [1] and [2], although from the variable 
UK Borrowers we do corroborate the findings of model [2] with the ones in model 
[7]. 
In table 4.2.2, regarding variables W.E. before crisis and W.E. crisis we just 
corroborate the findings in model [5] with the ones in model [10] that state that 
CDOs issued in Continental Europe before crisis had a lower credit spread than 
the ones issued in the U.K. and in the U.S. Regarding the variable UK Borrowers, 
we can corroborate that issuances of ABS and CDOs in the U.K. have a higher 
credit spread than the ones in the U.S. and Continental Europe. 
Concluding the robustness checks analysis with table 4.2.3, we cannot 
corroborate that issuances in the UK have a higher credit neither that CDOs 
issued in Continental Europe before crisis have a lower credit spread  
Finally, we can partially corroborate the hypothesis that credit spreads are 
higher in the U.S. rather than in W.E. Firstly, we can corroborate that for all types 
of securities the credit spread is higher in the U.K. vis-à-vis with the U.S. and 
Continental Europe. Secondly, we cannot conclude if the credit spreads are 
higher in the U.S. comparing to Continental Europe. 
Regarding deal type, we can corroborate the following hypothesis: (i) AS bond 
credit spreads in the U.K. are higher than those of bonds issued in the U.S. or 
Continental Europe for all AS bond types; (ii) CDOs issued in Continental 
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Europe have lower credit spreads than those issued by U.S. banks in the pre-
crisis period; (iii) ABS issued by Continental European banks have higher 
credit spreads than ABS issued by U.S. banks.; and (iv) for the remaining 
periods and AS bond types, spreads do not differ significantly between 
securities issued in the U.S. and Continental Europe. 
 
3. The 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign 
debt crisis affected significantly AS bonds credit spread and pricing 
determinants. 
 
 To get insights in order to perceive on how the financial crisis affected the 
credit spreads of AS bonds we have now to observe table 3.3.3 in which the 
sample of AS bonds issued by banks between 2000 and 2016 was split in two 
periods: (i) pre-crisis period that goes from January, 1st of 2000 to September 2008 
and; (ii) crisis period that covers the period from September 2008 until the end of 
our period of analysis, December 31st, 2016. Moreover, in that table is also 
possible to analyse the split by security type. 
If we focus ourselves, firstly in the U.S., we can perceive that the average credit 
spread in the pre-crisis period is higher for MBS than the one in the crisis period, 
27.96 against -3.71 (with 1% level significance of difference between sample 
means). By contrast, for ABS and CDOs issued in the U.S. the mean credit spreads 
increases on both, from -1.57 to 40.35 and from 80.93 to 132.44, respectively (with 
1% level significance of difference between sample means). Analysing now the 
issuances made by W.E. banks we can see a decrease in the mean credit spreads 
or MBS and ABS if we compare the pre-crisis with the crisis period. MBS average 
reduces from 12.26 to -43.85, and ABS from 19.14 to 1.47 (having both samples 
1% level of significance of difference between sample means). By opposite CDOs 
reveal an increase from 33.49 to 180.41 (with 1% level significance of difference 
between sample means). 
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From the analysis of the multivariate analysis section we can state looking at 
models [1] and [2] that issuances during crisis in W.E. have a higher credit spread 
than the ones issued before crisis, although the other models do not allow us to 
corroborate that idea. 
 Summing up, we can state that: (i) for both pre-crisis and crisis period the 
average credit spreads of MBS are lower in W.E.; (ii) in the pre-crisis period the 
average credit spread for ABS was higher in W.E. and the average credit spread 
for CDOs was higher in the U.S.; (iii) during the crisis period the average credit 
spread for ABS was higher in the U.S. and the average credit spread for CDOs 
was higher in the W.E. 
Regarding the other pricing factors, we can highlight the following evidences: 
(i) the average credit rating for CDOs increase not just in the U.S. but also in W.E., 
if we compare the pre-crisis with the crisis period (with 1% level of significance 
of difference between sample means); (ii) the average number of tranches reduces 
from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period in all securities and regions, but for 
CDOs issued in W.E.; (iii) the average country risk increases in W.E. during the 
crisis period; (iv) fixed rate issuances increase during the crisis period except for 
CDOs issued in the U.S. (with 1% level of significance of difference between 
sample means, except for CDOs issued in W.E. that was insignificant). 
In order to supplement the previous analysis, from table 4.1.1, model [1] we 
can conclude that the coefficients between W.E. before crisis (26.60) and W.E. 
crisis (74.16) are different (with 1%level of significance), being the last one higher, 
yielding that during crisis the credit spread in W.E. was higher than the one in 
W.E. before crisis. If we turn our attention to model [2] of the same table the 
coefficient for W.E. crisis (20.88) is still higher than the one for W.E. pre-crisis (-
45.98) (with 1%level of significance), which yields the same conclusion as before. 
Additionally, the models presented in table 4.1.2 could have helped us to 
better detail the above-mentioned statements, although, in this table for model 
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[4] the coefficients for W.E. before crisis and W.E. crisis are insignificant, 
happening the same in mode [3] for the variable W.E. before crisis, and in model 
[5] for the variable W.E. crisis, which do not help to corroborate the previous 
findings. 
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6 Conclusion 
The impact of the 2007/2008 financial crisis in the credit spread of Asset 
Securitization Bonds has been a matter of study by the researchers since those 
financial products played an important role in triggering the global financial 
crisis. However, literature investigating differences in credit spreads and pricing 
factors between bonds issued in the U.S. versus W.E., as well as in the pre-crisis 
vis-à-vis crisis periods is scant. 
This study intends to fill that gap in the literature by performing analyses 
comparing pre- and crisis periods, bonds issued by banks in the U.S. and W.E. 
markets, and deal types (ABS versus MBS versus CDO).  
Considering the hypotheses raised, we find that despite both in the U.S. and 
in W.E. the credit spread of AS bonds is affected by similar factors, we can point 
out some differences in these factors between the regions. AS bonds issued by 
the U.S. banks have a higher proportion of fixed rate issuances, lower average 
transaction size and tranche size, and less issuances exposed to currency risk. We 
also show that by far the U.K. is the analysed region in which the credit spreads 
are higher, for the three types of securities (ABS, MBS and CDOs), if we compare 
with the U.S. and Continental Europe. Furthermore we concluded that the credit 
spreads of AS bonds issued in Continental Europe in the before crisis period are 
lower than the ones issued in the U.S. and in the U.K. Additionally in a deep 
analysis of Continental Europe, we can evidence the effects brought by the 
Quantitative Easing programmes launched by ECB after the financial crisis, 
starting in 2011, showing that the credit spreads for AS bonds issued in 
Continental Europe during crisis were lower than the ones issued in this region 
before crisis. 
Regarding CDOs we concluded that the credit spread of this type of securities 
is lower in Continental Europe before crisis rather than in the U.S. or the U.K. 
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Analysing the pricing factors of AS bonds, as expected we corroborate the 
previous literature that states that rating affects positively the credit spread (one-
unit downgrade in the rating of a tranche impacts positively the credit spread). 
Moreover, we concluded that an increase in the number of banks involved in an 
AS bond transaction reduces the credit spread of that transaction. 
It was also concluded that an increase in the slope of the yield curve (difference 
between the 10yrs government yield and the 3mth government yield) reflects a 
decrease in the credit spread. Furthermore, an increase in the country risk is 
associated to an increase in the credit spread, as well as an increase in volatility. 
Regarding Creditor Rights we also concluded that countries with a higher 
creditor rights coefficient have issuances of AS bonds with lower credit spreads. 
With respect to callability, we concluded that callable issuances have a higher 
credit spread, except for CDOs, in which we achieved the opposite conclusion. 
The last conclusion, in line with the previous findings was that an increase in 
the maturity of an AS bond’s tranche reflects a decrease in the credit spread. 
As a topic for further studies, the U.K. seems to be a region of potential interest 
by the researchers since it was not explained in this study why the credit spreads 
of AS bonds issued in the U.K. are significantly higher than those issued by banks 
located in the U.S. and Continental Europe. Additionally, we found interesting 
news about the securitization markets of China and South America. Therefore, it 
is interesting to know that in China between 2014 and 2016 we accounted 329 
deals, resulting in 1,118 tranches, in a total amount of $184 billion. Not so much 
but also a growing securitization market, is the South America one with 31 deals 
between 2014 and 2016, 50 tranches and with $3 billion issued. A research 
investigating these markets would be very valuable to understand better the 
functioning of AS market. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 Table 7.1.: Rating Scale 
 
Rating Scale Category 
AAA 1 Prime 
Investm
ent grade 
AA+ 2 
High Grade AA 3 
AA- 4 
A+ 5 
Upper medium Grade A 6 
A- 7 
BBB+ 8 
Lower Medium Grade BBB 9 
BBB- 10 
BB+ 11 
Non-investment grade 
speculative 
Speculative grade 
BB 12 
BB- 13 
B+ 14 
Highly speculative B 15 
B- 16 
CCC+ 17 Substantial risks 
CCC 18 Extremely speculative 
CCC- 19 
Default imminent with 
little prospect of recovery CC 20 
C 21 
DDD 22 In default 
DD 22 
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Country Laporta's Creditor Rights until 2005 Laporta's Creditor Rights after 2005
Austria 2 2
Belgium 0 2
Denmark 2 3
Finland 3 3
France 3 3
Germany 1 2
Greece 2 2
Ireland 4 3
Italy 1 2
Netherlands 2 2
Norway 4 3
Portugal 3 2
Spain 4 4
Sweden 3 3
Switzerland 2 2
UK 5 4
USA 5 2
Table 7.2.: Laporta’s Creditor Rights 
 130 
 
Dependent variable: [1b] [1c]
Credit Spread (bps) ABS, MBS 
and CDO in 
US and UK
ABS, MBS and 
CDO before 
crisis
Independent variables:
Intercept 255.30 ** -280.03 ***
(2.17) (-8.95)
WE before crisis 88.77 *** 41.71 ***
(6.23) (6.05)
WE after crisis 67.18 ** -
(2.25) -
Rated -61.92 *** -77.23 ***
(-6.79) (-5.10)
Rated rating 21.49 *** 19.95 ***
(72.18) (70.78)
Transaction size 0.00 *** 0.00 **
(2.58) (2.28)
Tranche to transaction -0.04 0.15 ***
(-1.30) (5.41)
Callable 6.59 *** -5.22 *
(2.95) (-1.93)
ABS -63.07 *** -39.27 ***
(-20.40) (-11.63)
MBS -55.33 *** -37.65 ***
(-13.38) (-8.65)
Number of banks -4.75 *** -2.38 ***
(-8.45) (-4.13)
Currency Risk -75.66 *** -56.99 ***
(-10.98) (-8.76)
Maturity -1.76 *** -0.72 ***
(-19.68) (-7.76)
Subordinated Debt 31.78 *** 24.85 ***
(12.90) (9.26)
Fixed Rate 151.79 *** 150.68 ***
(54.05) (47.66)
Country Risk 66.07 *** -8.08 ***
(4.04) (-2.64)
Risk Free 60.74 *** 49.49 ***
(26.79) (22.68)
Volatility 2.116 *** 2.74 ***
(8.53) (10.29)
Government yield -38.83 *** 13.38 ***
(-13.76) (4.55)
GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 ***
(-1.53) (9.83)
Creditor Rights -31.66 *** -6.49 ***
(-5.58) (-4.37)
UK - -
- -
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of observations 59,728 51,499
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.61
Table 7.3.: Regression analysis on the impact of the independent variables on the 
credit spread 
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Dependent variable: [6a] [6b]
Adjusted Spread (bps) ABS, MBS 
and CDO 
in US and 
UK
ABS, MBS 
and CDO 
before 
crisis
Independent variables:
Intercept 613.98 *** 148.80 ***
(8.27) (4.87)
WE before crisis -92.19 *** -39.15 ***
(-5.56) (-7.05)
WE after crisis -124.44 ***
(-3.49)
Rated -66.42 *** -62.51 ***
(-7.29) (-3.36)
Rated rating 22.18 *** 20.88 ***
(75.60) (75.38)
Transaction size 0.00 ** 0.00 ***
(-2.21) (-3.64)
Tranche to transaction -0.19 *** -0.03
(-7.49) (-1.26)
Callable 10.91 *** -1.25
(6.04) (-0.62)
ABS -54.67 *** -36.30 ***
(-20.47) (-13.47)
MBS -43.33 *** -29.29 ***
(-13.00) (-9.31)
Number of banks -3.55 *** -1.72 ***
(-7.95) (-4.08)
Currency Risk -12.80 * -2.54
(-1.92) (-0.43)
Maturity -0.53 *** 0.35 ***
(-7.40) (5.22)
Subordinated Debt 15.86 *** -9.86 ***
(7.35) (-4.25)
Fixed Rate -61.12 *** -52.35 ***
(-31.87) (-25.18)
Country Risk -15.61 -4.57 *
(-1.23) (-1.72)
Risk Free -1.09 -1.80
(-0.64) (-1.16)
Volatility 1.690 *** 1.42 ***
(7.23) (7.08)
Government yield -0.40 5.87 ***
(-0.17) (2.75)
GDP per capita -0.01 *** 0.00 ***
(-4.55) (6.02)
Creditor Rights 9.86 -6.67 ***
(1.61) (-4.77)
UK - -
- -
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of observations 56,714 47,457
Adjusted R2 0.54 0.50
Table 7.4.: Regression analysis on the impact of the independent variables on 
the adjusted spread 
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